AZL-113462: CVE-2026-97041 affecting package golang 1.27.4-1

Published Nov 11, 2026
·
Updated

Building a malicious package containing "//go:cgo" compiler directives could inject arbitrary flags into the external linker invocation on ELF platforms. The compiler and linker did not reject commas in "//go:cgoimportdynamic", "//go:cgoexportdynamic", "//go:cgoexportstatic", "//go:cgoimportstatic", and "//go:cgodynamiclinker" directives, and the linker passed the dynamic linker path using "-Wl,--dynamic-linker,<path>". Furthermore, the two-argument form of "//go:cgoimportdynamic" (which is permitted in non-cgo Go source files) could overwrite the external symbol name of a symbol already marked for cgo export. A symbol name or dynamic linker path containing a comma or leading "@" could split "-Wl,--export-dynamic-symbol=" or "-Wl,--dynamic-linker," into arbitrary host linker flags or response file arguments. The compiler and linker now reject commas in "//go:cgo" symbol and dynamic linker directives, the linker passes "-Wl,--dynamic-linker=<path>", and "cgoimportdynamic" no longer overwrites symbols exported via "cgoexportdynamic" or "cgoexportstatic".

Affected Software

1 affected component
azure-linux/golang>=1.27.0<=1.27.4-1

Event History

Nov 11, 2026
Advisory Published
via OSV·05:19 AM
Data Sourced
via OSV·05:19 AM
DescriptionAffected Software

Child vulnerabilities

Contains the following vulnerabilities.

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What conditions are required to exploit this issue?

An attacker would need to get a malicious Go package containing crafted //go:cgo_* compiler directives built. Exploitation applies to external linker invocations on ELF platforms and relies on commas or a leading @ in affected directive symbol names or dynamic-linker paths.

2

What could a successful exploit allow?

The crafted directives could inject arbitrary flags into the host linker invocation. A leading @ could also cause host linker response-file arguments to be processed.

3

Are non-cgo Go source files relevant?

Yes. The two-argument form of //go:cgo_import_dynamic is permitted in non-cgo Go source files and could overwrite the external symbol name of a symbol already marked for cgo export.

4

How can I determine whether a package build is exposed?

Review packages being built for //go:cgo_import_dynamic, //go:cgo_export_dynamic, //go:cgo_export_static, //go:cgo_import_static, and //go:cgo_dynamic_linker directives. Directive symbol names or dynamic-linker paths containing commas or beginning with @ indicate the relevant injection conditions.

Contact

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