AZL-115429: CVE-2026-99635 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost/vsock: size receive SKBs from declared payload
vhostvsockallocskb() sizes the skb from iovlength(), the total guest descriptor length. virtiotransportincrxpkt() instead adds hdr->len to rxbytes and bufused, and budgets each queued skb as SKBTRUESIZE(0). The guest controls the descriptor length and hdr->len independently.
A guest can therefore provide a 64 KiB descriptor while declaring a zero payload. The descriptor-sized skb remains queued, rxbytes and bufused remain unchanged, and only the fixed queue-entry budget limits retention. This is not a lifetime leak: the skb is freed when dequeued or at socket teardown. Repeating this across connections can nevertheless exhaust host memory. On Linux v7.2, 455 such descriptors retained 30,255,680 bytes for a 262,144-byte receive buffer; a full-payload control retained 265,984 bytes.
Vhost previously read hdr->len and allocated pkt->buf from that value. The conversion from virtiovsockpkt to skbuff instead allocated receive skbs from the descriptor length, introducing the allocation-accounting mismatch.
Copy the header into a stack object and validate hdr->len before allocating the skb. Size the allocation as sizeof(hdr) + payloadlen so descriptor capacity no longer determines queued memory. Check payloadlen against len - sizeof(hdr) to avoid addition overflow on 32-bit hosts.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Compensating control
In vhost/vsock receive-SKB allocation, copy the header to a stack object and validate hdr->len before allocating; derive the payload length as hdr->len - sizeof(hdr), guard against addition overflow, and size the skb from sizeof(hdr) plus the declared payload length rather than the guest descriptor’s total capacity.