AZL-115543: CVE-2026-99694 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: do not index before the entry array when dividing an empty bucket
ocfs2dividexattrbucket() appends an empty bucket carrying a sentinel hash when the source bucket has no divide position, taking that hash from xhentries[start - 1]. ocfs2xattrfinddividepos() returns count when every entry shares one hash, and its loop does not run at all for count < 2, so an empty bucket comes back with start == count == 0 and the read is xhentries[-1].
That is outside the countedbyle(xhcount) bounds of xhentries[] and lands on the header, so the value picked up is xhcount | xhfreestart << 16. One above it is written into the new bucket's xhentries[0] and committed, which leaves a bucket whose first hash does not follow the bucket before it. ocfs2xattrbucketfind() binary searches on xhentries[0], so the broken key hides the range the sentinel was meant to cover: getxattr() answers -ENODATA for an attribute that is stored, and an insert can go to the wrong bucket and leave two copies of a name. The cross cluster divide hands the same value back as a tree record's ecpos, which then claims a hash range it does not cover.
Read xhentries[0] instead. The branch is only reached when every entry shares one hash, so for a non-empty bucket it holds the same value, and for an empty one it is the slot that carries the bucket key.
An empty bucket reaches the divide from ocfs2checkxattrbucketcollision(), which reports no collision for one, through ocfs2addnewxattrbucket() and ocfs2extendxattrbucket(). It does not take a failed set to get there: a divide that finds no position is itself what leaves an empty sentinel bucket behind, and a later extend can pick it as the target.