AZL-115627: CVE-2026-99742 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: charge shared policy nodes
Any local user can bypass memory.max with mbind() on a tmpfs file, and allocate unbounded kernel memory.
mbind() sets a NUMA memory policy for a range of a mapping. If the mapping is of a shmem and friends, the kernel also stores the policy on the inode, in a tree with one entry per range of the file.
Each mbind() on a single page of a mapping can add one shared policy node (struct spnode) and one struct mempolicy to that tree. They outlive the mapping and stay around until the inode is destroyed. The tree is not bounded by the file size, so the file can be empty.
Memory that user space can allocate must be charged to a memory cgroup. A slab cache does that for all of its objects if it is created with SLABACCOUNT. numapolicyinit() creates the slab caches for both structs without SLABACCOUNT, so they are not charged to any cgroup.
Reproduced with mbind() on single pages of an empty tmpfs file, from a cgroup with memory.max=8M: the global OOM killer killed tasks owned by root, and the machine panicked.
Fix this by creating both caches with SLABACCOUNT. This change implies that mbind() can now fail when running into memcg limits. Further, the policycache also serves task and VMA policies, so they are similarly accounted now.
Note that per-file limits are not really helpful, as the user could simply use many files; having limits per user is tricky as well.
Fix generated by an LLM and submitted by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: smaller description tweaks ]
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Configuration
Create both slab caches with SLAB_ACCOUNT so their objects are charged to the memory cgroup.
Linux kernel slab caches for struct sp_node and struct mempolicy SLAB_ACCOUNT = enabled