First published: Wed Sep 12 2007(Updated: )
reported via secalert By default, the sealert program writes diagnostic messages to the file /tmp/sealert.log. It does not check to ensure that this file does not already exist, or that it is not a symbolic link. An unprivileged local attacker can exploit this flaw to cause arbitrary files writable by other users to be overwritten when those users run sealert. The sealert program is run automatically, without user action, as part of the default RHEL 5 GNOME desktop session. It does not appear to be possible for the attacker to cause arbitrary data to be written to sealert.log, but the previous contents of the file are erased.'
Credit: secalert@redhat.com
Affected Software | Affected Version | How to fix |
---|---|---|
Redhat Enterprise Linux | =5.0 | |
Redhat Enterprise Linux Desktop | =5 | |
Selinux Setroubleshoot | =2.0.5 |
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