First published: Fri Feb 27 2009(Updated: )
It was discovered that camel's NTLM SASL authentication mechanism did not properly validate server's challenge packets (NTLM authentication type 2 packets, [1]). In the ntlm_challenge() in camel/camel-sasl-ntlm.c, length of the domain string that was copied from type 2 to type 3 packet (client's reply to server's challenge) was not properly validated against the rest of the data received from the server. 127 ntlm_set_string (ret, NTLM_RESPONSE_DOMAIN_OFFSET, 128 token->data + NTLM_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN_OFFSET, 129 atoi (token->data + NTLM_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN_LEN_OFFSET)); Server could specify larger length than the actual data sent in the packet, causing the client to disclose portion of its memory, or crash. Note: length value was not properly extracted from the packet too, as it is not passed as string, rather as 16-bit LE value. [1] <a href="http://curl.haxx.se/rfc/ntlm.html#theType2Message">http://curl.haxx.se/rfc/ntlm.html#theType2Message</a>
Credit: secalert@redhat.com
Affected Software | Affected Version | How to fix |
---|---|---|
GNOME evolution-data-server | <=2.24.5 | |
GNOME evolution-data-server | =2.25.92 |
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