CVE-2023-37478: pnpm incorrectly parses tar archives relative to specification
Summary It is possible to construct a tarball that, when installed via npm or parsed by the registry is safe, but when installed via pnpm is malicious, due to how pnpm parses tar archives.
Details The TAR format is an append-only archive format, and as such, the specification for how to update a file is to add a new record to the end with the updated version of the file. This means that it is completely valid for an archive to contain multiple copies of, say, package.json, and the expected behavior when extracting is that all versions other than the last get ignored.
This is further complicated by that during tarball extraction, all package managers are configured to drop the first path component, so collisions can be created simply by using multiple root folders in the archive, even without performing updates.
When pnpm extracts a tar archive via tar-stream, it appears to extract only the first file of a given name and discards all subsequent files with the same name.
PoC Create a root folder with the following layout: - a/package.json - package/package.json - z/package.json
File contents: a/package.json json { "name": "test-package", "version": "0.1.0", "description": "This is a bad version of a test package", "dependencies": { "react": "^15" } } package/package.json json { "name": "test-package", "version": "0.1.0", "description": "This is a bad version of a test package", "dependencies": { "react": "^16" } } z/package.json json { "name": "test-package", "version": "0.1.0", "description": "This is the good version of a test package", "dependencies": { "react": "^17" } }
Then use the tar binary to produce a tarball (working directory is the root folder): tar -c -z --format ustar -f package.tgz a package z The order of the folders at the end matters; whichever one is last will end up being the package.json that wins when extracted by npm; the one that is first will be the one that wins when extracted by pnpm.
Install the tarball via the file: protocol.
Observe that with npm, the lockfile has react@17, while with pnpm it has react@15.
Impact This can result in a package that appears safe on the npm registry or when installed via npm being replaced with a compromised or malicious version when installed via pnpm.
Other sources
pnpm is a package manager. It is possible to construct a tarball that, when installed via npm or parsed by the registry is safe, but when installed via pnpm is malicious, due to how pnpm parses tar archives. This can result in a package that appears safe on the npm registry or when installed via npm being replaced with a compromised or malicious version when installed via pnpm. This issue has been patched in version(s) 7.33.4 and 8.6.8.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2023-37478?
CVE-2023-37478 is a vulnerability in the pnpm package manager that allows the installation of a malicious tarball.
How does CVE-2023-37478 work?
CVE-2023-37478 works by exploiting the way pnpm parses tar archives, allowing a tarball to be installed that is safe via npm but malicious via pnpm.
What is the severity of CVE-2023-37478?
CVE-2023-37478 has a severity rating of 9.8 (Critical).
Which versions of pnpm are affected by CVE-2023-37478?
Versions of pnpm up to and including 7.33.4 are affected by CVE-2023-37478.
How can I fix CVE-2023-37478?
To fix CVE-2023-37478, update pnpm to version 8.6.8 or later.