First published: Mon Sep 18 2023(Updated: )
### Impact In certain conditions, the memory used by the builtins `raw_call`, `create_from_blueprint` and `create_copy_of` can be corrupted. - For `raw_call`, the argument buffer of the call can be corrupted, leading to incorrect `calldata` in the sub-context. - For `create_from_blueprint` and `create_copy_of`, the buffer for the to-be-deployed bytecode can be corrupted, leading to deploying incorrect bytecode. Below are the conditions that must be fulfilled for the corruption to happen for each builtin: #### `raw_call` - memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata and - The `data` argument of the builtin is `msg.data`. and - The `to`, `value` or `gas` passed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function) #### `create_copy_of` - memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata and - The `value` or `salt` passed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function) #### `create_from_blueprint` - memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata and - Either no constructor parameters are passed to the builtin or `raw_args` is set to True. and - The `value` or `salt` passed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function) Note: When the builtin is being called from an `internal` function `f` from a function `g`, the issue is not present provided that `g` has written to memory before calling `f`. #### Examples ##### `raw_call` In the following contract, calling `bar(1,1)` will return: ``` Python ae42e95100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000001 ``` instead of: ``` Python ae42e95100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 ``` ```Python identity: constant(address) = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004 @external def foo(): pass @internal @view def get_address()->address: a:uint256 = max_value(uint256) # 0xfff...fff return identity @external def bar(f:uint256, u:uint256) -> Bytes[100]: a: Bytes[100] = raw_call(self.get_address(), msg.data, max_outsize=100) return a ``` ##### `create_copy_of` In the following contract, after calling `test()`, the code deployed at `self.created_address` does not match the bytecode at `target`. ``` Vyper created_address: public(address) @external def test(target: address) -> address: # The expression in salt= is complex and will require to store to memory self.created_address = create_copy_of(target, salt = keccak256(_abi_encode(target))) return self.created_address ``` ##### `create_from_blueprint` In the following contract, after calling `test()`, the init bytecode used to create the contract deployed at the address `self.created_address` will not match the blueprint bytecode stored at `target`. ``` Vyper created_address: public(address) salt: constant(bytes32) = keccak256("kebab") @external @payable def test(target: address): # The expression in salt= is complex and will require to store to memory self.created_address = create_from_blueprint(target, code_offset=0, salt=keccak256(_abi_encode(target))) ``` ### Patches issue tracking in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/issues/3609, patched in #3610 ### Workarounds The complex expressions that are being passed as kwargs to the builtin should be cached in memory prior to the call to the builtin. For the last example above, it would be: ``` Vyper created_address: public(address) salt: constant(bytes32) = keccak256("kebab") @external @payable def test(target: address): salt: bytes32 = keccak256(_abi_encode(target)) self.created_address = create_from_blueprint(target, code_offset=0, salt=salt) ``` ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_
Credit: security-advisories@github.com security-advisories@github.com security-advisories@github.com
Affected Software | Affected Version | How to fix |
---|---|---|
pip/vyper | >=0.3.4<=0.3.9 | 0.3.10 |
Vyperlang Vyper | <0.3.10 |
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CVE-2023-42443 is a vulnerability in Vyper, a Pythonic smart contract language for the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
CVE-2023-42443 can lead to memory corruption in Vyper's builtins, potentially resulting in incorrect calldata in certain contexts.
CVE-2023-42443 affects Vyper version 0.3.9 and possibly earlier versions.
CVE-2023-42443 has a severity rating of 8.1 (high).
To fix CVE-2023-42443, update Vyper to a version that is not affected by the vulnerability.