CVE-2023-51649: Nautobot missing object-level permissions enforcement when running Job Buttons
Impact
When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level extras.runjob permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general?). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this specific Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case (/extras/job-button/<uuid>/run/) The effect is that a user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs.
Not all Jobs can be configured as JobButtons; only those implemented as subclasses of JobButtonReceiver can be used in this way, so this vulnerability only applies specifically to JobButtonReceiver subclasses.
Additionally, although the documentation states that both extras.runjob permission and extras.runjobbutton permission must be granted to a user in order to run Jobs via JobButton, the extras.runjobbutton permission is not actually enforced by the view code, only by the UI by disabling the button from being clicked normally. Furthermore, the extras.runjobbutton permission never prevented invoking Jobs (including JobButtonReceiver subclasses) via the normal "Job Run" UI, so after some discussion, we've decided that the extras.runjobbutton permission is redundant, and as it never achieved its stated/documented purpose, the fixes below will remove the UI check for extras.runjobbutton and all other references to the extras.runjobbutton permission, rather than adding enforcement of this previously unenforced permission.
Patches Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Fix will be available in Nautobot 1.6.8 (https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/4995) and 2.1.0 (https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/4993)
Workarounds Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Partial mitigation can be achieved by auditing JobButtonReceiver subclasses defined in the system and restricting which users are permitted to create or edit JobButton records.
References
- https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/issues/4988 - https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/4993 - https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/4995
Other sources
Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform built as a web application atop the Django Python framework with a PostgreSQL or MySQL database. When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level extras.runjob permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this specific Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case. A user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs. Fix will be available in Nautobot 1.6.8 and 2.1.0
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Patch Available
Patch Available
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2023-51649?
The severity of CVE-2023-51649 is categorized as a medium risk due to inadequate object-level permissions for running specific Jobs.
How do I fix CVE-2023-51649?
To fix CVE-2023-51649, ensure the implementation of object-level permissions checks for executing specific Jobs on Nautobot.
Which versions of Nautobot are affected by CVE-2023-51649?
CVE-2023-51649 affects Nautobot versions 1.5.14 to 1.6.8 and 2.0.0 to 2.1.0.
What type of permissions are misconfigured in CVE-2023-51649?
CVE-2023-51649 involves misconfigured object-level permissions that fail to verify user permissions for specific Jobs.
Is there a workaround for CVE-2023-51649?
Currently, a workaround for CVE-2023-51649 is to limit access to users on a case-by-case basis while a fix is being applied.