CVE-2024-53142: initramfs: avoid filename buffer overrun
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
initramfs: avoid filename buffer overrun
The initramfs filename field is defined in Documentation/driver-api/early-userspace/buffer-format.rst as:
37 cpiofile := ALGN(4) + cpioheader + filename + "\0" + ALGN(4) + data ... 55 ============= ================== ========================= 56 Field name Field size Meaning 57 ============= ================== ========================= ... 70 cnamesize 8 bytes Length of filename, including final \0
When extracting an initramfs cpio archive, the kernel's doname() path handler assumes a zero-terminated path at @collected, passing it directly to filpopen() / initmkdir() / initmknod().
If a specially crafted cpio entry carries a non-zero-terminated filename and is followed by uninitialized memory, then a file may be created with trailing characters that represent the uninitialized memory. The ability to create an initramfs entry would imply already having full control of the system, so the buffer overrun shouldn't be considered a security vulnerability.
Append the output of the following bash script to an existing initramfs and observe any created /initramfstestfnameoverrunAA path. E.g. ./reproducer.sh | gzip >> /myinitramfs
It's easiest to observe non-zero uninitialized memory when the output is gzipped, as it'll overflow the heap allocated @outbuf in gunzip(), rather than the initrdstart+initrdsize block.
---- reproducer.sh ---- nilchar="A" # change to "\0" to properly zero terminate / pad magic="070701" ino=1 mode=$(( 0100777 )) uid=0 gid=0 nlink=1 mtime=1 filesize=0 devmajor=0 devminor=1 rdevmajor=0 rdevminor=0 csum=0 fname="initramfstestfnameoverrun" namelen=$(( ${#fname} + 1 )) # plus one to account for terminator
printf "%s%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%s" \ $magic $ino $mode $uid $gid $nlink $mtime $filesize \ $devmajor $devminor $rdevmajor $rdevminor $namelen $csum $fname
termpadlen=$(( 1 + ((4 - ((110 + $namelen) & 3)) % 4) )) printf "%.s${nilchar}" $(seq 1 $termpadlen) ---- reproducer.sh ----
Symlink filename fields handled in dosymlink() won't overrun past the data segment, due to the explicit zero-termination of the symlink target.
Fix filename buffer overrun by aborting the initramfs FSM if any cpio entry doesn't carry a zero-terminator at the expected (namelen - 1) offset.
Other sources
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
initramfs: avoid filename buffer overrun
The initramfs filename field is defined in Documentation/driver-api/early-userspace/buffer-format.rst as:
37 cpiofile := ALGN(4) + cpioheader + filename + "\0" + ALGN(4) + data ... 55 ============= ================== ========================= 56 Field name Field size Meaning 57 ============= ================== ========================= ... 70 cnamesize 8 bytes Length of filename, including final \0
When extracting an initramfs cpio archive, the kernel's doname() path handler assumes a zero-terminated path at @collected, passing it directly to filpopen() / initmkdir() / initmknod().
If a specially crafted cpio entry carries a non-zero-terminated filename and is followed by uninitialized memory, then a file may be created with trailing characters that represent the uninitialized memory. The ability to create an initramfs entry would imply already having full control of the system, so the buffer overrun shouldn't be considered a security vulnerability.
Append the output of the following bash script to an existing initramfs and observe any created /initramfstestfnameoverrunAA path. E.g. ./reproducer.sh | gzip >> /myinitramfs
It's easiest to observe non-zero uninitialized memory when the output is gzipped, as it'll overflow the heap allocated @outbuf in gunzip(), rather than the initrdstart+initrdsize block.
---- reproducer.sh ---- nilchar="A" # change to "\0" to properly zero terminate / pad magic="070701" ino=1 mode=$(( 0100777 )) uid=0 gid=0 nlink=1 mtime=1 filesize=0 devmajor=0 devminor=1 rdevmajor=0 rdevminor=0 csum=0 fname="initramfstestfnameoverrun" namelen=$(( ${#fname} + 1 )) # plus one to account for terminator
printf "%s%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%s" \ $magic $ino $mode $uid $gid $nlink $mtime $filesize \ $devmajor $devminor $rdevmajor $rdevminor $namelen $csum $fname
termpadlen=$(( 1 + ((4 - ((110 + $namelen) & 3)) % 4) )) printf "%.s${nilchar}" $(seq 1 $termpadlen) ---- reproducer.sh ----
Symlink filename fields handled in dosymlink() won't overrun past the data segment, due to the explicit zero-termination of the symlink target.
Fix filename buffer overrun by aborting the initramfs FSM if any cpio entry doesn't carry a zero-terminator at the expected (namelen - 1) offset.
— NVD
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— Launchpad
Affected Software
Remediation
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2024-53142?
CVE-2024-53142 is classified with a medium severity rating due to its potential for a filename buffer overrun in the Linux kernel.
How do I fix CVE-2024-53142?
To fix CVE-2024-53142, you need to update the affected Linux kernel to a version that includes the patch for this vulnerability.
Which versions of the Linux kernel are affected by CVE-2024-53142?
CVE-2024-53142 affects Linux kernel versions from 2.6.12 to 4.19.325, 4.20 to 6.6.64, 6.7 to 6.11.11, and 6.12 to 6.12.2.
What type of vulnerability is CVE-2024-53142?
CVE-2024-53142 is a buffer overrun vulnerability that can be exploited through improperly managed filename fields in initramfs.
Is there any workaround for CVE-2024-53142?
No specific workaround for CVE-2024-53142 is recommended; the advised action is to apply the appropriate kernel updates.