First published: Tue Dec 03 2024(Updated: )
### Summary The `/debug/querylogz` and `/debug/env` pages for `vtgate` and `vttablet` do not properly escape user input. The result is that queries executed by Vitess can write HTML into the monitoring page at will. ### Details These pages are rendered using `text/template` instead of rendering with a proper HTML templating engine. ### PoC Execute any query where part of it is HTML markup, for example as part of a string. To make it easier to observe you might want to make sure the query takes a few seconds to complete, giving you time to refresh the status page. Example query that can trigger the issue: ```sql UPDATE users SET email = CONCAT("<img src=https://cataas.com/cat/says/oops>", users.idUser, "@xxx") WHERE email NOT LIKE '%xxx%' AND email != "demo@xxx.com" ``` Result: ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c583816b-157c-474e-bbed-152b3dc0372f) ### Impact Anyone looking at the Vitess status page is affected. This would normally be owners / administrators of the Vitess cluster. Anyone that can influence what text show up in queries can trigger it. This would normally be pretty much everybody interacting with a system that uses Vitess as a backend.
Credit: security-advisories@github.com security-advisories@github.com
Affected Software | Affected Version | How to fix |
---|---|---|
go/vitess.io/vitess | <0.19.8 | 0.19.8 |
go/vitess.io/vitess | >=0.20.0-rc1<0.20.4 | 0.20.4 |
go/vitess.io/vitess | >=0.21.0-rc1<0.21.1 | 0.21.1 |
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