CVE-2025-30202: Data exposure via ZeroMQ on multi-node vLLM deployment
Impact In a multi-node vLLM deployment, vLLM uses ZeroMQ for some multi-node communication purposes. The primary vLLM host opens an XPUB ZeroMQ socket and binds it to ALL interfaces. While the socket is always opened for a multi-node deployment, it is only used when doing tensor parallelism across multiple hosts.
Any client with network access to this host can connect to this XPUB socket unless its port is blocked by a firewall. Once connected, these arbitrary clients will receive all of the same data broadcasted to all of the secondary vLLM hosts. This data is internal vLLM state information that is not useful to an attacker.
By potentially connecting to this socket many times and not reading data published to them, an attacker can also cause a denial of service by slowing down or potentially blocking the publisher.
Detailed Analysis
The XPUB socket in question is created here:
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/c21b99b91241409c2fdf9f3f8c542e8748b317be/vllm/distributed/devicecommunicators/shmbroadcast.py#L236-L237
Data is published over this socket via MessageQueue.enqueue() which is called by MessageQueue.broadcastobject():
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/devicecommunicators/shmbroadcast.py#L452-L453
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/devicecommunicators/shmbroadcast.py#L475-L478
The MessageQueue.broadcastobject() method is called by the GroupCoordinator.broadcastobject() method in parallelstate.py:
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/parallelstate.py#L364-L366
The broadcast over ZeroMQ is only done if the GroupCoordinator was created with usemessagequeuebroadcaster set to True:
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/parallelstate.py#L216-L219
The only case where GroupCoordinator is created with usemessagequeuebroadcaster is the coordinator for the tensor parallelism group:
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/parallelstate.py#L931-L936
To determine what data is broadcasted to the tensor parallism group, we must continue tracing. GroupCoordinator.broadcastobject() is called by GroupCoordinator.broadcoasttensordict():
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/parallelstate.py#L489
which is called by broadcasttensordict() in communicationop.py:
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/communicationop.py#L29-L34
If we look at getdriverinputandbroadcast() in the V0 workerbase.py, we'll see how this tensor dict is formed:
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/worker/workerbase.py#L332-L352
but the data actually sent over ZeroMQ is the metadatalist portion that is split from this tensordict. The tensor parts are sent via torch.distributed and only metadata about those tensors is sent via ZeroMQ.
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/54a66e5fee4a1ea62f1e4c79a078b20668e408c6/vllm/distributed/parallelstate.py#L61-L83
Patches
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/17197
Workarounds
Prior to the fix, your options include: 1. Do not expose the vLLM host to a network where any untrusted connections may reach the host. 2. Ensure that only the other vLLM hosts are able to connect to the TCP port used for the XPUB socket. Note that port used is random.
References
Relevant code first introduced in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/6183
Other sources
vLLM is a high-throughput and memory-efficient inference and serving engine for LLMs. Versions starting from 0.5.2 and prior to 0.8.5 are vulnerable to denial of service and data exposure via ZeroMQ on multi-node vLLM deployment. In a multi-node vLLM deployment, vLLM uses ZeroMQ for some multi-node communication purposes. The primary vLLM host opens an XPUB ZeroMQ socket and binds it to ALL interfaces. While the socket is always opened for a multi-node deployment, it is only used when doing tensor parallelism across multiple hosts. Any client with network access to this host can connect to this XPUB socket unless its port is blocked by a firewall. Once connected, these arbitrary clients will receive all of the same data broadcasted to all of the secondary vLLM hosts. This data is internal vLLM state information that is not useful to an attacker. By potentially connecting to this socket many times and not reading data published to them, an attacker can also cause a denial of service by slowing down or potentially blocking the publisher. This issue has been patched in version 0.8.5.
— NVD
Affected Software
Remediation
Patch Available
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2025-30202?
The severity of CVE-2025-30202 is considered high due to the open XPUB ZeroMQ socket binding to all interfaces, which can expose sensitive communication in a multi-node vLLM deployment.
How do I fix CVE-2025-30202?
To fix CVE-2025-30202, upgrade the vLLM package to version 0.8.5 or higher, which addresses the vulnerability.
What systems are affected by CVE-2025-30202?
CVE-2025-30202 affects vLLM versions from 0.5.2 to 0.8.4 when deployed in a multi-node environment using ZeroMQ.
What vulnerability does CVE-2025-30202 describe?
CVE-2025-30202 describes a vulnerability in vLLM that involves an exposed ZeroMQ XPUB socket in multi-node setups, which can lead to unauthorized access to communication.
Is CVE-2025-30202 a network-related vulnerability?
Yes, CVE-2025-30202 is classified as a network-related vulnerability due to the improper configuration of a networking component in the vLLM system.