CVE-2025-38670: arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(), call_on_irq_stack()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpuswitchto(), callonirqstack()
cpuswitchto() and callonirqstack() manipulate SP to change to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled. Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely, is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks.
In cpuswitchto(), it can happen when SPEL0 points to the new task, but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SPEL0), clobbering it.
In callonirqstack(), it can happen when switching from the task stack to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack, calls callonirqstack() and clobbers the task SCS pointer with the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use !
This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS, or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIGVMAPSTACK or FPAC if enabled.
This is possible on a default config, but unlikely. However, when enabling CONFIGARM64PSEUDONMI, DAIF is unmasked and instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU should receive based on priority. Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU even in cpuswitchto() and callonirqstack(), possibly very frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading to unpredictable kernel panics.
Completely mask DAIF in cpuswitchto() and restore it when returning. Do the same in callonirqstack(), but restore and mask around the branch. Mask DAIF even if CONFIGSHADOWCALLSTACK is not enabled for consistency of behaviour between all configurations.
Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF, as the existing one saves but only masks IF.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2025-38670?
CVE-2025-38670 has a moderate severity rating due to potential impacts on system stability and security in the Linux kernel.
How do I fix CVE-2025-38670?
To fix CVE-2025-38670, upgrade to the latest patched version of the Linux kernel that addresses this vulnerability.
What versions of the Linux kernel are affected by CVE-2025-38670?
CVE-2025-38670 affects multiple versions of the Linux kernel prior to the release of the security patches.
What are the risks associated with CVE-2025-38670?
The risks associated with CVE-2025-38670 include potential denial of service and exploitation of stack manipulation vulnerabilities.
Is there a workaround for CVE-2025-38670?
There are no known workarounds for CVE-2025-38670; the recommended solution is to apply the kernel update.