CVE-2025-61919: Rack is vulnerable to a memory-exhaustion DoS through unbounded URL-encoded body parsing

Summary

Rack::Request#POST reads the entire request body into memory for Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded, calling rack.input.read(nil) without enforcing a length or cap. Large request bodies can therefore be buffered completely into process memory before parsing, leading to denial of service (DoS) through memory exhaustion.

Details

When handling non-multipart form submissions, Rack’s request parser performs:

ruby formvars = getheader(RACKINPUT).read

Since read is called with no argument, the entire request body is loaded into a Ruby String. This occurs before query parameter parsing or enforcement of any paramslimit. As a result, Rack applications without an upstream body-size limit can experience unbounded memory allocation proportional to request size.

Impact

Attackers can send large application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies to consume process memory, causing slowdowns or termination by the operating system (OOM). The effect scales linearly with request size and concurrency. Even with parsing limits configured, the issue occurs before those limits are enforced.

Mitigation

Update to a patched version of Rack that enforces form parameter limits using queryparser.bytesizelimit, preventing unbounded reads of application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies. Enforce strict maximum body size at the proxy or web server layer (e.g., Nginx clientmaxbodysize, Apache LimitRequestBody).