CVE-2025-65019: Astro Cloudflare adapter has a Stored Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in /_image endpoint

Summary A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro when using the @astrojs/cloudflare adapter with output: 'server'. The built-in image optimization endpoint (/image) uses isRemoteAllowed() from Astro’s internal helpers, which unconditionally allows data: URLs. When the endpoint receives a valid data: URL pointing to a malicious SVG containing JavaScript, and the Cloudflare-specific implementation performs a 302 redirect back to the original data: URL, the browser directly executes the embedded JavaScript. This completely bypasses any domain allow-listing (image.domains / image.remotePatterns) and typical Content Security Policy mitigations.

Affected Versions - @astrojs/cloudflare ≤ 12.6.10 (and likely all previous versions) - Astro ≥ 4.x when used with output: 'server' and the Cloudflare adapter

Root Cause – Vulnerable Code File: nodemodules/@astrojs/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts

ts export function isRemoteAllowed(src: string, ...): boolean { if (!URL.canParse(src)) { return false; } const url = new URL(src);

// Data URLs are always allowed if (url.protocol === 'data:') { return true; }

// Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) { return false; } // ... further http/https allow-list checks }

In the Cloudflare adapter, the /image endpoint contains logic similar to:

ts const href = ctx.url.searchParams.get('href'); if (!href) { // return error }

if (isRemotePath(href)) { if (isRemoteAllowed(href, imageConfig) === false) { // return error } else { //redirect to return the image return Response.redirect(href, 302); } }

Because data: URLs are considered “allowed”, a request such as: https://example.com/image?href=... (base64-encoded malicious SVG)

triggers a 302 redirect directly to the data: URL, causing the browser to render and execute the malicious JavaScript inside the SVG.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

1. Create a minimal Astro project with Cloudflare adapter (output: 'server'). 2. Deploy to Cloudflare Pages or Workers. 3. Request the image endpoint with the following payload:

https://yoursite.com/image?href=

(Base64 decodes to: <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert('zomasec')</script></svg>)

4. The endpoint returns a 302 redirect to the data: URL → browser executes the <script> → alert() fires.

Impact - Reflected/Strored XSS (depending on application usage) - Session hijacking (access to cookies, localStorage, etc.) - Account takeover when combined with CSRF - Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers - Bypasses image.domains / image.remotePatterns configuration entirely

Safe vs Vulnerable Behavior Other Astro adapters (Node, Vercel, etc.) typically proxy and rasterize SVGs, stripping JavaScript. The Cloudflare adapter currently redirects to remote resources (including data: URLs), making it uniquely vulnerable.

References - Vulnerable function: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/main/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts - Similar data: URL bypass in WordPress: CVE-2025-2575