CVE-2026-100606: Flowise through 3.1.4 Authentication Bypass via SSO Email Match
Flowise through 3.1.4 (Enterprise/platform mode with SSO enabled) contains an authentication bypass in the SSO login path. When an SSO callback arrives with an email matching a user whose status is INVITED, verifyAndLogin (SSOBase.ts:80-94) copies the user record from the database — including the server-stored single-use invitation tempToken — into the data passed to AccountService.register(). The register handler's token lookup, email match, and expiry checks therefore pass trivially against the server's own token instead of a caller-supplied one, and the account and its organization membership are flipped to ACTIVE. As a result, anyone able to authenticate at any configured SSO provider using a pending invitee's email address as the email claim can take over that invitation and obtain the invited user's access to the organization without ever possessing the emailed invitation token, for as long as the invitation is valid (24 hours by default). At the time of the advisory no patched version was available.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Flowise deployments through 3.1.4 are exposed when running in Enterprise/platform mode with SSO enabled and when there is a still-valid INVITED user account. The affected invitation remains usable for 24 hours by default.
What must an attacker be able to do to exploit it?
An attacker must be able to authenticate through any configured SSO provider while presenting the pending invitee's email address as the email claim. They do not need the invitation token sent by email.
Is user interaction required?
No. The attacker can complete the SSO login flow and activate the invited account without action from the invitee or possession of the emailed invitation token.
What can be done if patching is not available?
No patched version was available at the time of the advisory. To reduce exposure, disable SSO or avoid retaining pending invitations in deployments where SSO is enabled; removing or expiring outstanding invitations eliminates the described target condition.