CVE-2026-101065: Obot Quickstart Docker Deployment Unauthenticated Admin Access
Obot is an open-source AI agent/MCP platform. In all versions up to and including commit d7e6970, the Docker quickstart command documented in the README starts the container listening on 0.0.0.0:8080 with authentication disabled by default. When authentication is disabled, every request is mapped to a synthetic "nobody" user that holds the Owner and Admin roles, so any unauthenticated party who can reach the exposed port obtains full administrative access to the Obot API and UI, including the ability to register and launch attacker-controlled MCP servers. Because the quickstart also mounts /var/run/docker.sock into the container, the MCP runtime backend reachable this way has access to the host's Docker control surface. The fix is documentation-only: the quickstart now enables authentication, and operators who followed the previous instructions should set OBOTSERVERENABLEAUTHENTICATION=true before exposing the host to any untrusted network.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Configuration
Set OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true before exposing the host to any untrusted network.
Obot OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION = true
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed?
Deployments started with the README Docker quickstart in versions up to and including commit d7e6970 are exposed if port 8080 is reachable by an untrusted party. The quickstart binds the service to 0.0.0.0:8080 and disables authentication by default.
Does an attacker need credentials or prior access?
No. Any party able to reach the exposed port can access the Obot API and UI without authentication, because requests are assigned to a synthetic user with Owner and Admin roles.
What is the likely host-level impact?
An unauthenticated attacker can register and launch attacker-controlled MCP servers. The affected quickstart mounts /var/run/docker.sock into the container, allowing the reachable MCP runtime backend to access the host's Docker control surface.
What should operators do if they used the old quickstart?
Set OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true before exposing the host to any untrusted network. Restrict network access to port 8080 until authentication is enabled.
How can I determine whether my deployment is affected?
Check whether the instance was launched using the prior README Docker quickstart, whether it listens on 0.0.0.0:8080, and whether OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION is disabled or unset. Also verify whether /var/run/docker.sock is mounted into the container.