CVE-2026-101340: Query ID predictable from a short sequence of observations
Net::DNS uses a 16-bit query ID to match responses to the corresponding requests. In versions up to and including 1.57, the ID is obtained from Perl's built-in rand() function. An attacker that can observe the sequence of query IDs is able to expose the internal state of the PNRG and hence predict query IDs before they are transmitted. The victim Net::DNS instance is then exposed to forged responses injected by the attacker. Note that the deduplication cache in 1.57 has no impact on the feasibility of this attack.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Net::DNSto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.58
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to forged DNS responses?
Net::DNS versions through 1.57 are exposed when an attacker can observe a sequence of query IDs from the target instance. The attacker can use those observations to predict IDs before queries are transmitted and inject forged responses.
Does the deduplication cache in version 1.57 mitigate this issue?
No. The provided advisory states that the deduplication cache in 1.57 does not affect the feasibility of the attack.
What does an attacker need to exploit the weakness?
The attacker needs to observe a short sequence of DNS query IDs generated by the victim Net::DNS instance. No privileges or user interaction are indicated by the supplied severity vector.