CVE-2026-102354: BentoPDF: SSRF via DNS Rebinding (TOCTOU) in Cloudflare CORS Proxy Worker

Published Oct 14, 2026
·
Updated

BentoPDF is a privacy-focused PDF toolkit that runs in the browser. In versions through 2.8.6, cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js performs a DNS-over-HTTPS safety check in hostnameResolvesToPrivate(), as used by isValidCertificateUrl() and isValidTsaUrl(), separately from the outbound fetch(targetUrl, ...). In deployments where PROXYSECRET validation is not enabled, a direct client that controls authoritative DNS can forge the Origin header, supply a certificate, OCSP, CRL, or TSA URL that passes the proxy's accepted path checks, return a public address during validation, and return a private or link-local address during the later fetch. The endpoint can return allowed response bodies to the attacker, but exploitation requires precise timing, redirects and IP-literal obfuscation are blocked, and network reachability limits the target. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.

Affected Software

1 affected component
BentoPDF BentoPDF<=2.8.6

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade BentoPDF to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.8.7

Event History

Oct 14, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·07:00 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·07:00 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed?

Deployments running BentoPDF through version 2.8.6 are exposed when the Cloudflare CORS proxy worker is deployed without PROXY_SECRET validation enabled. The attack also depends on the worker having network reachability to the private or link-local target.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit this?

The attacker needs to directly access the proxy, control authoritative DNS for a supplied certificate, OCSP, CRL, or TSA hostname, and forge the Origin header. They must make DNS return a public address during validation and a private or link-local address for the subsequent fetch, requiring precise timing.

3

Are redirects or IP-address URLs viable bypasses?

No. Redirects and IP-literal obfuscation are blocked; exploitation relies on DNS rebinding between the DNS-over-HTTPS safety check and the outbound fetch.

4

What can be done before updating?

Enable PROXY_SECRET validation on the Cloudflare CORS proxy worker to prevent direct unauthenticated use of the endpoint. Also restrict the worker's network reachability to private and link-local services where possible.

5

What version contains the fix?

The issue is fixed in BentoPDF version 2.8.7.

Contact

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