CVE-2026-102371: wsl-pro-service: Ubuntu Pro token exposed via process command-line arguments
In wsl-pro-service before 0.1.19ubuntu3, the service component which runs as root inside each WSL instance attaches the instance to Ubuntu Pro by executing the pro client with the Ubuntu Pro token passed as a command-line argument (pro attach <token>). On systems where /proc is mounted without process-hiding mitigations (such as hidepid), which is the default in WSL, an unprivileged local user or process in the same WSL instance can read the token from /proc/<pid>/cmdline while the attach process is running. The leaked token could then be used to attach other machines to the victim's Ubuntu Pro subscription and gain unauthorized access to Ubuntu Pro services.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
wsl-pro-serviceto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.1.19ubuntu3
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
An unprivileged local user or process in the same WSL instance can exploit it if it can inspect process command lines through /proc while the Ubuntu Pro attachment process is running.
Is the default WSL configuration affected?
Yes. WSL normally mounts /proc without process-hiding mitigations such as hidepid, allowing local processes to read /proc/<pid>/cmdline.
What must an attacker obtain to misuse the Ubuntu Pro subscription?
The attacker must capture the Ubuntu Pro token from the command line of the running "pro attach" process. The token could then be used to attach other machines to the victim's Ubuntu Pro subscription and access Ubuntu Pro services.
What can reduce exposure if an update is not immediately available?
Mounting /proc with process-hiding mitigations such as hidepid can prevent unprivileged users or processes from reading other processes' command lines. This issue affects wsl-pro-service versions before 0.1.19ubuntu3.