CVE-2026-102510: Apache PLC4X: Go binding: unbounded allocation and framing failures on wire-controlled lengths
Integer Overflow, Improper Validation of Array Index, Uncontrolled Recursion and Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value in the Go implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4Go) allow a malicious device, or an attacker able to inject network traffic, to crash or exhaust the memory of the client application, causing a denial of service.
The individual defects are: - Generated parsers pre-allocate arrays with the element count claimed on the wire (0.13.0 through 0.13.1). - Transport read helpers allocate buffers of the size claimed on the wire without an upper bound. - ADS and KNXnet/IP response handling indexes into received data without checking its length, causing a panic. - ADS and EIP frame-length handling accepts, or arithmetically wraps to, a length of zero, breaking message framing. - Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Java implementation is covered by CVE-2026-102509 https://cveprocess.apache.org/cve5/CVE-2026-102509 .
Additionally, length and position arithmetic in generated serializers was performed in 16-bit integers. If an application forwards attacker-influenced payloads larger than 8 KB, the length field wraps, and the remainder of the payload may be interpreted by the receiving device (for example, an ADS PLC) as additional, independent protocol messages.
This issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0. PLC4Go is consumed as the Go module github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4go; versions refer to the corresponding Apache PLC4X releases.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4goto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.0.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this issue?
PLC4Go client applications that communicate with a malicious device, or whose network traffic can be injected or manipulated by an attacker, are exposed. Applications that forward attacker-influenced payloads larger than 8 KB are also affected by serializer length wrapping.
What can an attacker achieve?
An attacker can crash the client application or exhaust its memory, causing denial of service. Malformed ADS and KNXnet/IP responses can trigger panics, while malformed frame lengths can disrupt message framing.
What input conditions trigger the resource-exhaustion paths?
The affected parsers and transport helpers use element counts or buffer sizes claimed on the wire without an upper bound. Recursive protocol types also lack a nesting-depth limit, allowing deeply nested input to consume resources.
Are default network assumptions sufficient protection?
No. Exploitation is possible from a malicious device or from an attacker able to inject network traffic; the provided information does not identify any configuration setting that disables the affected parsing and framing behavior.