CVE-2026-102695: OmniFaces: Forged combined-resource IDs and related output/push boundaries

Published Oct 14, 2026
·
Updated

OmniFaces is a utility library for Faces. In OmniFaces versions before 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2, CombinedResourceHandler accepts a structurally valid deflated and base64 encoded combined resource ID without verifying that the server issued it. A forged ID can cause unbounded decoded output, add unique reconstructed IDs to a process-lifetime cache, or combine resources other than stylesheets and scripts. Because jakarta.faces.RESOURCEEXCLUDES is not applied by this custom resolution path, a forged ID can disclose Facelets source from the webapp resource tree or META-INF/resources. In a deployment configured with the wildcard CDN mapping, a forged ID that selects omnifaces.graphic can also cause a blind, deployment-dependent server-side fetch whose destination derives partly from the request Host header. The flaw does not provide arbitrary file read or establish arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF. The shared authenticity failure permits memory exhaustion and limited resource disclosure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2.

Affected Software

1 affected component
OmniFaces OmniFaces<1.14.3, <2.7.33, <3.14.23, <4.7.12, <5.4.2

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade OmniFaces to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 5.4.2

Event History

Oct 14, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:58 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:58 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed to the server-side fetch behavior?

The blind server-side fetch behavior requires a deployment configured with the wildcard CDN mapping and a forged ID that selects omnifaces.graphic. Its destination is deployment-dependent and partly derived from the request Host header.

2

What can an unauthenticated attacker do with a forged resource ID?

An attacker can submit a structurally valid deflated and base64-encoded ID without needing the server to have issued it. This can produce unbounded decoded output, populate a process-lifetime cache with unique reconstructed IDs, combine non-stylesheet and non-script resources, and potentially disclose Facelets source from the webapp resource tree or META-INF/resources.

3

Does this issue enable arbitrary file reads or unrestricted SSRF?

No. The issue does not provide arbitrary file read, arbitrary-scheme SSRF, or arbitrary-destination SSRF.

4

How can the issue be remediated?

Upgrade to OmniFaces 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, or 5.4.2, as applicable to the version line in use.

Contact

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