CVE-2026-102711: Medium severity Microsoft ThreadX vulnerability

Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via txmmodulemanagermemoryload / txmmodulemanagerinplaceload — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in TXMMODULEPREAMBLE is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB read (codesize trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as codestart + preambleoffset with only a != 0 check, and the preamble checksum never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded).