CVE-2026-102904: JupyterLab: Argument injection in JupyterLab extension uninstall exposes server-readable files and internal URLs

Published Sep 29, 2026
·
Updated

JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From JupyterLab 4.0.0 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, the PyPI Extension Manager uninstall request reaches ExtensionHandler.post, which validates extension names for installation but passes uninstall names to PyPIExtensionManager.uninstall and python -m pip uninstall without rejecting option-like values. The security impact requires that the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, the account can call the extension API, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts; otherwise the user can already read files and make outbound requests directly. An authenticated user with extension API access can supply a pip requirements option to make the server read a local file or fetch an internal URL, and reflected parse errors can return the first unparsable line or response content. A pip log option can also create or corrupt a chosen path with pip-generated log text, but the requester cannot select an arbitrary disclosed line or arbitrary file content, and the injection does not add code execution or availability impact beyond ordinary package removal. This issue is fixed in JupyterLab 4.5.11 and 4.6.4.

Affected Software

1 affected component
pypi/jupyterlab>=4.0.0<4.5.11, >=4.6.0<4.6.4

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade JupyterLab to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.5.11
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade JupyterLab to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.6.4

Event History

Sep 29, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·08:47 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·08:47 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·09:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are meaningfully exposed to this issue?

Exposure requires the PyPI Extension Manager to be enabled and an authenticated account that can call the extension API. Deployments where users can already use local kernels or terminals are not meaningfully expanded by this issue, because those capabilities already allow direct file reads and outbound requests.

2

What can an authenticated attacker do through the uninstall request?

They can provide pip requirements options that cause the server to read a local file or request an internal URL. Reflected parsing errors may disclose the first unparsable line of a local file or response content; pip log options may also create or corrupt a selected path with pip-generated log text.

3

Does exploitation provide code execution or a broad file-write primitive?

No. The issue does not add code execution or availability impact beyond ordinary package removal, and the attacker cannot choose arbitrary file contents to write or an arbitrary line to disclose.

Contact

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