CVE-2026-103964: Download Manager <= 3.3.71 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Sensitive Information Exposure via Email Template Token Injection in 'first_name' Profile Field Token Injection into Suspension Email

Published Oct 10, 2026
·
Updated

The Download Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.71 via the 'firstname' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to extract the administrator's full Cookie header, including wordpressloggedin session cookies, from the suspension email sent during the administrator's authenticated request, enabling full session hijack and account takeover. Exploitation requires an administrator to perform the Suspend action against the attacker's account, which causes the plugin to synchronously compile and send the suspension email inside the administrator's authenticated HTTP request — making the administrator's session cookies available to the template engine at send time.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Download Manager<=3.3.71

Event History

Oct 10, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:26 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:26 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:16 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who can exploit this issue?

Any authenticated user with Subscriber-level access or higher can initiate the attack by supplying a crafted value in their first_name profile field. The attack succeeds only if an administrator later suspends that attacker's account.

2

Is administrator interaction required for exploitation?

Yes. An administrator must perform the Suspend action against the attacker’s account; the plugin sends the suspension email synchronously within that administrator’s authenticated request.

3

What information can be exposed and what is the impact?

The attacker can extract the administrator’s full Cookie header, including wordpress_logged_in_* session cookies. Those cookies can enable session hijacking and takeover of the administrator account.

4

How can I determine whether an attempted attack may have occurred?

Review suspension actions involving low-privileged accounts and inspect the affected users’ first_name profile values for suspicious email-template token content. The provided data does not identify a specific token pattern or logging artifact.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
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