CVE-2026-104872: Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages expose database username via unconditional db.user span attribute
Impact
Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation- packages recorded the database connection username as the db.user span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by enhancedDatabaseReporting or any other opt-in flag, and it was the default behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23.
The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal:
- Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. adminreadwrite, appreadonlyprod) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration.
Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below):
| Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver | < 0.66.0 | 0.66.0 | | @opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex | < 0.65.0 | 0.65.0 | | @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 | | @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 | | @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2 | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 | | @opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb | < 0.46.0 | 0.46.0 | | @opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg | < 0.73.0 | 0.73.0 | | @opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious | < 0.40.0 | 0.40.0 |
Patches
Fixed in the coordinated release on 2026-07-23 via feat!: only emit stable http, network and database attributes (#3585).
Upgrade to the patched version listed in the table above for each instrumentation package in use.
Workarounds
No configuration-level workaround exists in the affected versions: the db.user attribute cannot be suppressed without patching. As a partial mitigation, a custom SpanProcessor can be used to strip db.user from spans before they leave the process:
ts // Example: drop db.user in a custom SpanProcessor class StripDbUserProcessor implements SpanProcessor { onStart(span: Span) { span.setAttribute('db.user', null); } onEnd() {} shutdown() { return Promise.resolve(); } forceFlush() { return Promise.resolve(); } }
Users who control the downstream collector can also filter the attribute at the collector pipeline level.
Other sources
OpenTelemetry JavaScript Contrib provides instrumentation libraries for collecting telemetry from JavaScript applications. Prior to versions 0.66.0 of @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver, 0.65.0 of @opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex, 0.67.0 of @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose, @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql, and @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2, 0.46.0 of @opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb, 0.73.0 of @opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg, and 0.40.0 of @opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious, the packages add the database connection username to every instrumented database operation as the db.user span attribute. The attribute is emitted by default and is not controlled by enhancedDatabaseReporting or another opt-in setting. Configured observability backends therefore receive database account names that may expose service topology, role or environment information, and account naming patterns. This issue is fixed in versions 0.66.0, 0.65.0, 0.67.0, 0.46.0, 0.73.0, and 0.40.0 of the respective packages.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pgto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.73.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.67.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knexto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.65.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysqlto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.67.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongooseto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.67.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledbto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.46.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tediousto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.40.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driverto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.66.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driverto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.66.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knexto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.65.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongooseto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.67.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.67.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysqlto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.67.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledbto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.46.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pgto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.73.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tediousto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.40.0 - Compensating control
Use a custom SpanProcessor to strip or suppress the db.user span attribute before spans leave the process, or filter db.user at the downstream collector pipeline.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Are applications affected when enhanced database reporting is disabled?
Yes. The db.user span attribute is emitted by default and is not controlled by enhancedDatabaseReporting or another opt-in setting.
Who can obtain the exposed information?
Configured observability backends receive the database account names. Exposure therefore affects users or systems able to access the exported telemetry in those backends.
How can I determine whether telemetry has already exposed database usernames?
Inspect exported spans for the db.user attribute and check whether affected database instrumentation packages are below their fixed versions. The attribute is added to every instrumented database operation by vulnerable package versions.
Which versions remediate the issue?
Upgrade cassandra-driver to 0.66.0, knex to 0.65.0, mongoose, mysql, or mysql2 to 0.67.0, oracledb to 0.46.0, pg to 0.73.0, and tedious to 0.40.0.