CVE-2026-105684: Penpot: Share-link page-scope escape — comment RPCs leak comment content, author identity, and all page-ids for pages outside the share scope
Penpot is an open-source design and prototyping platform. Prior to 2.18.0, the get-comment-threads, get-comment-thread, and get-comments RPC commands use check-comment-permissions! but do not apply the share link's pages restriction. A holder of a page-scoped share link can retrieve comment threads and full comment bodies from other pages in the same file, including commenter names, email addresses, photos, and page identifiers. The disclosed page identifiers can also be used with affected page-reading functionality to access unshared design content. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Penpotto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.18.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
An attacker needs a page-scoped share link for a file. No user interaction is required, but the attacker must be able to invoke the affected comment RPC commands using that share-link access.
What information can be exposed outside the shared page?
The affected commands can expose comment threads and full comment bodies from other pages in the same file. Disclosed data includes commenter names, email addresses, photos, and identifiers for all pages, including pages outside the share scope.
Can the leaked page identifiers lead to access beyond comments?
Yes. The disclosed page identifiers can be used with affected page-reading functionality to access unshared design content.
Which versions are affected and what is the remediation?
Penpot versions prior to 2.18.0 are affected. Upgrade to version 2.18.0, which fixes the issue.