CVE-2026-107193: Foreman: api filter lookup ignores a search-limited filter permission
A flaw has been found in permission filters in the foreman package. The API loads a filter by its identifier and does not apply the search limit on the caller's permission. A low-privileged network attacker or user must already be allowed to delete filters for one role only. They can delete filters that belong to other unlocked roles. Those other roles then lose the access the deleted filters had granted.
Other sources
The API loads a filter by id without the caller's search limit. The lookup is Api::V2::FiltersController#resourcescope, which returns every filter. The action check only asks whether the caller has the delete permission at all. Nothing checks that specific filter on delete. A filter on a locked built-in role is still rejected.
The caller must be logged in and must hold a permission to delete filters that is limited by a search, for example to one role.
Deletion of a filter on another unlocked role was demonstrated through the API. The same delete through the web interface was refused. An update that moves a filter onto a role inside the caller's search was read from the code and was not demonstrated.
— Red Hat
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
An attacker must be authenticated and have permission to delete filters, with that permission restricted by a search limit such as filters for a single role. They must target a filter belonging to a different unlocked role.
Is the web interface affected?
The demonstrated unauthorized deletion was through the API. The same deletion attempt through the web interface was refused.
What is the impact of a successful exploit?
The attacker can delete permission filters from other unlocked roles despite their own search-limited authorization. Deleting those filters removes the access that the filters had granted to affected roles.
Are built-in locked roles vulnerable to filter deletion through this flaw?
No. Deletion of a filter on a locked built-in role is still rejected.
How can administrators identify potentially exposed accounts?
Review authenticated users or roles that have delete-filter permission constrained by a search expression, rather than unrestricted delete permission. Those accounts may be able to delete filters on other unlocked roles through the API.