CVE-2026-10774: PSA key-slot leak in Bluetooth Mesh subnet deletion leading to resource-exhaustion DoS

Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh subnet key management leaks one PSA Crypto key slot on every subnet-key teardown. In subsys/bluetooth/mesh/subnet.c, netkeyscreate() imports the Private Beacon Key into a PSA key slot under CONFIGBTMESHPRIVBEACONS (enabled by default), but subnetkeysdestroy() guarded the matching psadestroykey() with CONFIGBTMESHV1d1. That Kconfig symbol was removed when explicit Mesh 1.0.1 support was dropped, so the destroy branch became permanently dead code and the import is never balanced by a destroy.

The imbalanced teardown is reached every time subnet keys are destroyed: deleting a subnet (Config Server NetKey Delete), completing a Key Refresh Procedure (which retires the old key set), and resetting/re-provisioning the node. The over-the-air triggers are processed only under the node's device key, so they are exercisable by the provisioner or network administrator that owns the node, reachable over the Bluetooth Mesh network.

With the default CONFIGMBEDTLSPSAKEYSLOTCOUNT of 16, repeated add/delete or key-refresh cycles exhaust the shared PSA key-slot pool after roughly a dozen rounds. Once exhausted, btmeshprivatebeaconkey() and thus subnet creation fail: the node can no longer add subnets or complete key refresh, and other PSA crypto consumers on the device may be starved, until the device is rebooted. The fix aligns the destroy guard with the import guard (CONFIGBTMESHPRIVBEACONS) so each slot is freed.