CVE-2026-108258: Shiny for Python - Path traversal in bookmark restore
Impact
Shiny for Python's bookmark-restore path accepted a client-supplied stateid query-string value and joined it into the server-side bookmark directory (<cwd>/shinybookmarks/<id>) without validating it. A value containing .. path segments, or an absolute path, could therefore cause the server to open and parse input.json and values.json from a directory outside the bookmark store.
On a default application the restore was attempted whenever the client supplied a URL query string — including when bookmarking was disabled (bookmarkstore="disable") — so no opt-in configuration was required. For such applications the impact is an unauthenticated, server-side probe for the existence and JSON-validity of attacker-chosen paths, constrained to those two file names.
Applications configured with bookmarkstore="server" and using ui.inputfile() are affected more seriously. The file-input restore handler copies files out of the restore directory, so the contents of an attacker-selected file name within an attacker-selected directory could be read into the application.
Affected versions
1.4.0 through 1.6.3. Bookmarking was introduced in 1.4.0; earlier releases do not contain the affected code path and are not affected.
Patches
Fixed in 1.6.4. Upgrade with:
pip install --upgrade shiny
The fix validates bookmark IDs against an allowlist — a single path segment matching [A-Za-z0-9-]+, which cannot express a path separator, a .. parent reference, or an absolute path — before the ID is used to build a filesystem path. Bookmark IDs generated by Shiny are unaffected by this restriction. Restore is additionally gated on the application's bookmarkstore setting at a single point, so it no longer runs when bookmarking is disabled, and the on-disk restore path is honored only under bookmarkstore="server".
Workarounds
There is no configuration change that mitigates this on an affected version: the restore path ran even with bookmarkstore="disable". Deployments that cannot upgrade immediately can strip the stateid parameter from incoming query strings at a reverse proxy or load balancer, which prevents the affected code path from being reached.
Credits
Reported by @0xRenSec.
Other sources
Shiny for Python is a framework for building interactive web applications in Python. From 1.4.0 until 1.6.4, bookmark restore accepts a client-supplied stateid and joins it into the server-side shinybookmarks directory without validating that it is a single safe path segment. An unauthenticated request can use parent-directory segments or an absolute path to make the server open input.json and values.json outside the bookmark store, even when bookmarkstore is set to disable. In applications configured with bookmarkstore set to server and using ui.inputfile(), the restore handler can additionally copy and expose an attacker-selected file from an attacker-selected directory. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.4.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/shinyto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.6.4 - Upgrade
Upgrade
shinyto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.6.4 - Compensating control
If unable to upgrade immediately, strip the `_state_id_` parameter from incoming query strings at a reverse proxy or load balancer to prevent the affected restore code path from being reached.