CVE-2026-108265: enclave-os-mini: RA-TLS challenge certificates were not bound to the TLS session
Enclave OS Mini is a Rust-based runtime for confidential applications inside Intel SGX enclaves. Prior to wasm-v0.40.0, the SGX runtime's RA-TLS challenge certificate path placed the certificate public-key hash and client nonce in quote ReportData but omitted a value bound to the active TLS session. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing a relying party to accept an attacker-terminated connection as the attested enclave. This issue is fixed in wasm-v0.40.0.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
enclave-os-minito a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in wasm-v0.40.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Deployments using the SGX runtime's RA-TLS challenge certificate path before wasm-v0.40.0 are affected. A relying party that uses this path to validate an attested enclave is the party that can be deceived.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
The attacker must obtain an enclave TLS private key. With that key, they can relay a genuine quote to a separate connection and have an attacker-terminated connection accepted as the attested enclave.
What should teams do to remediate the issue?
Upgrade to wasm-v0.40.0 or later, which fixes the missing binding between the RA-TLS challenge certificate evidence and the active TLS session.