CVE-2026-108362: Privasys attested TLS accepted evidence from any unrevoked TEE platform (diversion attack)

Published Oct 12, 2026
·
Updated

Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients<0.11.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.11.0

Event History

Oct 12, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·07:06 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·07:06 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·08:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

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