CVE-2026-110337: CVE Record
The Strava datasource plugin's resource handler POST /strava-api forwards a client-supplied endpoint string, and its query parameters, to the Strava API (https://www.strava.com/api/v3/<endpoint>) without validation.
When the datasource is not in OAuth pass-through mode, the request is made with the access token stored on the datasource, not the caller's identity. Grafana authorises plugin resource calls only on the datasources:query permission, which Viewers have by default. Any such caller could therefore request any Strava API path the connected account's OAuth grant allows, for example athlete/clubs or routes/{id}, and read the response.
The plugin's frontend (stravaApi.ts) only needs a fixed set of paths: athlete, athlete/activities, activities/{id}, activities/{id}/streams and segments/{id}.
Requests to Strava are GET only, so the issue is read-only.
Affected: plugin versions 1.2.0 through 1.7.2. The fix restricts endpoint to those five patterns and is pending release. The check runs before the access token is resolved, so a rejected request never causes a token refresh or any call to Strava. Paths with .. segments are rejected as well.
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Compensating control
Restrict the Strava datasource resource handler to the five frontend-required endpoint patterns: athlete, athlete/activities, activities/{id}, activities/{id}/streams, and segments/{id}.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue in a Grafana instance?
Any caller with Grafana's datasources:query permission for the affected Strava datasource can exploit it. Viewers have this permission by default, so Viewer-level users may be able to read data available through the datasource's connected Strava account.
What access does an attacker need, and what can they do?
The attacker needs permission to query the datasource and must be able to submit a plugin resource request to POST /strava-api. They can request Strava API paths allowed by the connected account's OAuth grant, but requests to Strava are GET-only, so the impact is limited to reading responses.
Are all Strava datasource configurations affected?
The described exposure applies when the datasource is not in OAuth pass-through mode, because requests then use the access token stored on the datasource rather than the caller's identity. Affected plugin versions are 1.2.0 through 1.7.2.
What can be done before a fixed release is available?
Restrict access to the affected datasource by removing or limiting datasources:query permission for users who should not be able to query it, especially Viewer-role users. Review the OAuth grant on the connected Strava account and reduce its available data access where possible.
How can I determine whether requests are within the intended endpoint set?
The frontend only requires athlete, athlete/activities, activities/{id}, activities/{id}/streams, and segments/{id}. Requests for other Strava API paths, such as athlete/clubs or routes/{id}, indicate use beyond the intended endpoint set.