CVE-2026-110782: SAML2: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283: unsigned embedded Response bypasses HTTP-Artifact signature verification (no embedded-Issuer binding)

Published Nov 17, 2026
·
Updated

The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related functionality. From 6.2.2 until 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2, HTTPArtifact::receive() in src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php verifies a signed outer ArtifactResponse but returns an unsigned embedded SAML Response before calling verifyMessageSignature(). The signed path verifies with the artifact issuer's metadata keys without requiring the embedded Response issuer to match that artifact issuer. In a multi-IdP federation, an attacker controlling one trusted IdP can therefore return a validly signed outer ArtifactResponse containing an unsigned Response that claims a different IdP, bypassing the binding's embedded-message authentication. End-to-end impersonation requires a service provider using HTTP-Artifact and a downstream consumer that relies on the binding to authenticate the embedded Response rather than independently requiring a signature. This issue is fixed in versions 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2.

Affected Software

1 affected component
composer/simplesamlphp/saml2>=6.2.2<6.2.4, >=7.0.0-rc1<7.0.0-rc2

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.2.4
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.0.0-rc2

Event History

Nov 17, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:55 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:55 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·06:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are realistically exposed to impersonation?

Exposure requires a service provider that uses the HTTP-Artifact binding in a multi-IdP federation and passes the embedded Response to a downstream consumer that treats the binding as authentication. A trusted IdP controlled by an attacker must be able to produce a validly signed outer ArtifactResponse while claiming a different IdP in the unsigned embedded Response.

2

Does an attacker need prior access or user interaction?

No privileges or user interaction are required by the stated vector. However, the attacker must control one IdP that is already trusted in the federation and must be able to sign the outer ArtifactResponse with that IdP's metadata key.

3

Are all SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 users affected by default?

No. The described end-to-end impact depends on use of HTTP-Artifact, multiple trusted IdPs, and a downstream consumer that does not independently require a signature on the embedded Response.

4

What can be done if updating is not immediately possible?

Require downstream consumers to independently verify the embedded SAML Response signature rather than relying solely on HTTP-Artifact binding authentication. This prevents an unsigned embedded Response from being accepted on the affected path.

5

Which versions address the issue?

The issue is fixed in version 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2.

Contact

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