CVE-2026-110926: Openssh: openssh: shared lz77 compression dictionary leaks plaintext across channels

Published Oct 15, 2026
·
Updated

A flaw was found in OpenSSH. Outbound compression used deflateInit with the default level, so every channel on a connection shared one LZ77 search buffer. A peer who can write on one channel can recover plaintext from another channel by observing ciphertext lengths, as described in "Crossing the Streams" (Fabian Bäumer and Marcus Brinkmann, 2026). The fix switches outbound compression to ZHUFFMANONLY, which removes LZ77 matching and lowers the compression ratio. The RHEL maintainer will take that fix. The OpenSSH client does not offer compression by default. The server zlib default is delayed compression, which applies only if the client offers it.

Other sources

A flaw was found in OpenSSH. When compression is negotiated, channels on the same connection share one LZ77 dictionary. A peer who can write on one channel can recover plaintext from another channel by chosen-plaintext lengths.

— MITRE

Affected Software

1 affected component
OpenSSH OpenSSH

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Configuration

    Switch outbound compression from the default deflate/LZ77 mode to Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY to remove LZ77 matching across channels.

    OpenSSH outbound compression compression strategy = Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY

Event History

Oct 15, 2026
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·04:20 AM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:25 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:25 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

When is an OpenSSH connection exposed to this issue?

The issue applies only when compression is negotiated for the connection. The OpenSSH client does not enable compression by default, and the server's default zlib setting uses delayed compression, which only takes effect when the client offers compression.

2

What access does an attacker need to recover plaintext?

The attacker must be a peer on the same SSH connection and be able to write data on one channel. They can use chosen plaintext and ciphertext-length observations to recover plaintext from another channel sharing that connection's compression dictionary.

3

What is the mitigation described for affected deployments?

The described fix changes outbound compression to Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY, removing LZ77 matching between channel data at the cost of a lower compression ratio. If that fix is not yet available, avoiding negotiated SSH compression prevents the shared LZ77 dictionary condition.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203