CVE-2026-111771: Model Context Protocol TypeScript SDK: Server bearer authentication accepted tokens issued for another service

Published Oct 20, 2026
·
Updated

Summary In affected versions, the SDK's server-side bearer authentication had no way to check that a token was issued for your server (its audience). Where one authorization server issues tokens for several services, a valid token for another service was also accepted by your MCP server.

Am I affected? Yes, if your HTTP server uses requireBearerAuth() or verifyBearerToken(), its authorization server also issues tokens for other services, and your verifyAccessToken() does not check the token's audience (aud) itself.

Affected versions:

- @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.6.0 through 1.31.0 - @modelcontextprotocol/server 2.0.0 through 2.2.0 - @modelcontextprotocol/express 2.0.0 through 2.0.1 - @modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy 2.0.0 through 2.3.0

Fix Upgrade to:

- 1.x: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.32.0 or later - 2.x: @modelcontextprotocol/server 2.3.0 or later, together with @modelcontextprotocol/express 2.0.2 or later if you use it - @modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy 2.3.1 or later

Upgrading alone changes nothing. The patched versions add an expectedResource setting that is off by default. To turn the check on, make both of these changes together:

1. Pass the audience your authorization server puts in tokens for your server: requireBearerAuth({ verifier, expectedResource: new URL('https://mcp.example.com/mcp') }). 2. Return the token's audience from verifyAccessToken() as AuthInfo.resource, also a URL.

A token for another service then gets 401. With only the first change, every request gets 401.

If you cannot upgrade yet, reject any token whose aud does not include your server inside verifyAccessToken(). That closes the issue on every version.

Other sources

The Model Context Protocol TypeScript SDK provides TypeScript client and server implementations of the Model Context Protocol. From 1.6.0 until 1.32.0 in @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, from 2.0.0 until 2.3.0 in @modelcontextprotocol/server, from 2.0.0 until 2.0.2 in @modelcontextprotocol/express, and from 2.0.0 until 2.3.1 in @modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy, server-side bearer authentication could accept a valid access token issued for a different service because the SDK did not enforce the token audience. The affected surface is server-side HTTP bearer authentication. The trigger is a valid token whose audience names another service. The authorization server must issue tokens for multiple services, and the application's verifyAccessToken() must not independently validate aud. Applications already validating aud inside verifyAccessToken() are not affected. An attacker with a token for another service could authenticate to the MCP server and obtain the confidentiality and integrity capabilities granted to an authenticated caller. Upgrading alone leaves the new audience validation disabled. Operators must enable audience validation and provide the token audience together. Enabling only the expected audience check causes every request to receive HTTP 401. This issue is fixed in @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.32.0, @modelcontextprotocol/server 2.3.0, @modelcontextprotocol/express 2.0.2, and @modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy 2.3.1.

— MITRE

Affected Software

4 affected componentsFixes available
npm/@modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy>=2.0.0<2.3.1
2.3.1
npm/@modelcontextprotocol/express>=2.0.0<2.0.2
2.0.2
npm/@modelcontextprotocol/server>=2.0.0<2.3.0
2.3.0
npm/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk>=1.6.0<1.32.0
1.32.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.1
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@modelcontextprotocol/express to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.0.2
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@modelcontextprotocol/server to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.0
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.32.0
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.32.0
  6. Upgrade

    Upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/server to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.0
  7. Upgrade

    Upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/express to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.0.2
  8. Upgrade

    Upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.1
  9. Configuration

    Enable audience validation by configuring requireBearerAuth({ verifier, expectedResource: new URL('https://mcp.example.com/mcp') }); upgrading alone leaves this check disabled.

    MCP server bearer authentication expectedResource = new URL('https://mcp.example.com/mcp')
  10. Configuration

    Return the token's audience from verifyAccessToken() as AuthInfo.resource, also a URL, and configure it together with expectedResource.

    verifyAccessToken() AuthInfo.resource = the token audience as a URL

Event History

Oct 20, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·07:43 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·07:43 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Nov 5, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:08 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:08 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·09:18 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Does upgrading automatically enforce audience validation?

No. The patched versions add an expectedResource setting, but it is off by default; upgrading alone does not change token-validation behavior.

2

What would an attacker need to exploit this?

They need a valid token issued by the same authorization server for a different service. The MCP server accepts that token when its verifyAccessToken() implementation does not independently validate the token's aud claim.

Contact

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