CVE-2026-113730: OGNL stricter-invocation block list bypass via java.lang.reflect reflection proxies

Published Oct 20, 2026
·
Updated

OGNL is an Object Graph Navigation Library for Java. Prior to 3.4.13, the optional stricter-invocation mode in OgnlRuntime.invokeMethod checks the declaring class of the method that OGNL invokes but does not block java.lang.reflect.Method, java.lang.reflect.Constructor, or java.lang.reflect.Field. An attacker-controlled expression can invoke one of these reflection objects as a proxy for a method on a blocked class, causing the real operation to execute inside JDK reflection without passing through the stricter-invocation check again. Exploitation requires an application to evaluate untrusted OGNL expressions, use the default or an equivalently permissive MemberAccess that permits reflection, and rely on stricter invocation as a sandbox. Applications using a restrictive MemberAccess, including Apache Struts with SecurityMemberAccess, are not affected by this bypass. This issue is fixed in 3.4.13.

Affected Software

1 affected component
maven/ognl/ognl<3.4.13

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade OGNL to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.4.13
  2. Configuration

    Use a restrictive MemberAccess, such as Apache Struts SecurityMemberAccess, that does not permit the reflective bypass.

    OGNL MemberAccess = restrictive

Event History

Oct 20, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:24 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:24 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which applications are exposed to this bypass?

An application is exposed only if it evaluates untrusted OGNL expressions, relies on stricter-invocation mode as a sandbox, and uses the default or an equivalently permissive MemberAccess that allows reflection. Applications using restrictive MemberAccess, including Apache Struts with SecurityMemberAccess, are not affected by this bypass.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit the issue?

The attacker needs a way to supply an OGNL expression that the application evaluates. They can use java.lang.reflect.Method, Constructor, or Field objects as proxies to invoke operations on classes blocked by stricter-invocation checks.

3

What should be done if upgrading is not immediately possible?

Do not evaluate untrusted OGNL expressions, and use a restrictive MemberAccess that does not permit the reflection access required for the bypass. Do not rely on stricter-invocation mode alone as a sandbox.

4

How can I determine whether the deployed OGNL version is affected?

OGNL versions prior to 3.4.13 are affected under the vulnerable configuration. Version 3.4.13 contains the fix.

Contact

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