CVE-2026-114349: Apache Kafka: Denial of service via unbounded memory allocation when decoding compressed record batches

Published Oct 28, 2026
·
Updated

When a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body size from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it against the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the batch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce request can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that allocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request size limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared decompressed size.

Impact:

An authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads (reached when a batch's codec differs from the topic's compression.type and records are re-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the broker JVM. More seriously, a crafted record  is accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it on a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner thread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction then stops for the entire broker, including the internal consumeroffsets and transactionstate topics, and the condition persists across restarts until the offending record is removed. The impact is availability only; no data is disclosed or altered.

Mitigation:

Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0, and set max.decompressed.message.bytes (at the broker and/or topic level) to a bounded value appropriate for your workload. Upgrading alone is not sufficient: for backward compatibility this configuration defaults to an effectively unlimited value (about 2 GiB), so a broker remains exposed until the limit is set. Choose a value at or slightly above the largest legitimate decompressed record your applications produce, and comfortably below the broker heap divided by the number of request-handler and cleaner threads. Until you can upgrade and configure the limit, restrict Write access to trusted producers; quotas and max.message.bytes do not mitigate this issue.

Resolution:

From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: the broker validates a record's declared decompressed body size against max.decompressed.message.bytes before allocating, on the produce-validation, log-compaction, and timestamp-lookup paths, and rejects oversized or negative sizes with InvalidRecordException. Operators must set this configuration to a bounded value to be protected, as its default is effectively unlimited.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Apache Kafka

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade Apache Kafka to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.2.2
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Apache Kafka to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.3.2
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade Apache Kafka to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.4.0
  4. Configuration

    Set max.decompressed.message.bytes at the broker and/or topic level to a bounded value appropriate for the workload; upgrading alone is insufficient because the default is effectively unlimited.

    Apache Kafka broker/topic max.decompressed.message.bytes = A bounded value at or slightly above the largest legitimate decompressed record, and comfortably below broker heap divided by the number of request-handler and cleaner threads
  5. Compensating control

    Until upgrading and configuring max.decompressed.message.bytes, restrict Write access to trusted producers.

Event History

Oct 28, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:46 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:46 PM
DescriptionWeakness

Contact

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