CVE-2026-114406: Ca-certificates: distrust emudhra intermediate ca certificates due to security concerns
Distrust intermediate CA certificates due to security concerns
Other sources
In mcp (MCP Python SDK) 1.9.1 through 1.29.1 and 2.0.0a1 through 2.1.1, the OAuth client (mcp.client.auth) did not validate the authorization server metadata issuer on every discovery path and did not bind stored or pre-provisioned client credentials to their authorization server. A malicious or compromised MCP server could direct the client to a token endpoint of its choosing and receive the clientsecret, authorization code and PKCE codeverifier (or a signed client assertion) meant for the real authorization server. Fixed in 1.30.0 and 2.2.0.
— IBM
The system certificate authority (CA) store in Red Hat products, distributed via ca-certificates RPM packages, included multiple root CA certificates of authorities, which signed intermediate CA certificates with weak private keys issued by the eMudhra certificate authority. A man-in-the-middle attacker could use this flaw to issue certificates for arbitrary host names signed by the weak intermediate CA certificates, which would be considered trusted by a TLS/SSL client using system CA store and cause such clients to connect to malicious sites.
Due to inability to only distrust specific intermediate certificates in all clients using the system CA store, root CA certificates of authorities that signed weak intermediate CA certificates are being removed.
— NVD
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 1.30.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 2.2.0 - Compensating control
Remove from the system CA store the root CA certificates of authorities that signed weak intermediate CA certificates issued by eMudhra.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which systems are exposed to this issue?
TLS/SSL clients that use the Red Hat system CA store distributed through the ca-certificates RPM may trust certificates chained through the affected weak eMudhra intermediate certificates. Exposure is relevant when an attacker can position themselves to perform a man-in-the-middle attack.
What does an attacker need to exploit this?
An attacker must be able to conduct a man-in-the-middle attack and use a certificate for an arbitrary hostname signed by one of the weak intermediate CA certificates. User interaction is required according to the supplied severity vector.
What is the remediation approach?
The affected root CA certificates that signed the weak intermediate certificates are being removed from the system CA store. This broader removal is necessary because specific intermediate certificates cannot be distrusted across all clients using the system CA store.