CVE-2026-114606: draw.io Desktop: Arbitrary local-file read via read-side IPC (no blessed-path gate)

Published Oct 22, 2026
·
Updated

draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.

Affected Software

1 affected component
draw.io draw.io Desktop<31.4.4

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade draw.io Desktop to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 31.4.4

Event History

Oct 22, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:35 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:35 PM
DescriptionWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which installations are affected?

draw.io Desktop versions prior to 31.4.4 are affected. The issue applies to the official Electron desktop build.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?

An attacker needs code executing in a frame with the application's file:// origin, because the IPC handlers use a URL-prefix sender validation. That frame can supply filesystem paths to read-side IPC actions.

3

What data can be accessed?

The unprotected read-side actions can read local files and query file-related information using renderer-chosen paths. The affected actions include readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile.

4

Are file modifications possible through the same weakness?

The described authorization gap affects read-side handlers. Write-side handlers, including saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, and deleteFile, are protected by assertWritablePath.

5

How can the issue be remediated?

Update draw.io Desktop to version 31.4.4, which fixes the issue.

Contact

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