CVE-2026-114607: better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user
Am I affected?
You may be affected if you use better-auth from 1.4.0-beta.18 through versions before 1.7.7 with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in.
You are affected if all of these are true:
- Magic Link is enabled with default storeToken: "plain", or with storeToken: "hashed" and global verification.storeIdentifier: "hashed" (including a hashed default). - At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled. - OAuth state uses account.storeStateStrategy: "database", the default when a database or secondary storage is configured.
Cookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.
Summary
Better Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address. They never prove that they can read that email.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker who knows a user's email address can get a normal session for that user, with all of that account's permissions. They need no access to the mailbox, and they do not need to sign in with the OAuth provider or complete an OAuth callback.
If Magic Link sign-up is enabled and no user has the email address, the attacker can instead create an account that Better Auth wrongly marks as email verified, and is signed in to it. The false verified-email flag can also bypass Better Auth's default unproven-account protections when the mailbox owner later signs in, leaving the attacker's session in that account. Applications that trust verified email addresses or email domains may give this account more access, depending on the application.
Patches
The fix is merged for the planned better-auth 1.7.7 release. That package is not available yet.
Upgrade better-auth and installed Better Auth adapters, plugins, and integrations released alongside it together. Upgrade servers sharing verification storage in the same cutover. Request new Magic Links and restart pending OAuth or SAML sign-ins; links and state created before the upgrade cannot complete. Update custom verification.storeIdentifier.overrides rules to match the magic-link: and auth-state: prefixes. There is no user or account data migration, and public token values and API signatures are unchanged.
Workarounds
Until you upgrade to the fixed release, use one of these mitigations:
- Set account.storeStateStrategy to "cookie". If you also use OAuth Proxy, first configure one dedicated OAuth Proxy secret across all participating environments that differs from each environment's global Better Auth secret. Cookie-backed state can expose a separate OAuth Proxy account-takeover path when the proxy shares the global secret and implicit account linking is enabled. - Set the Magic Link plugin option storeToken to "hashed" and leave global verification.storeIdentifier unset or set it to "plain". Global identifier hashing does not prevent this issue when Magic Link tokens are also hashed. - Turn off Magic Link sign-in, or turn off social and Generic OAuth sign-in.
Setting disableSignUp: true on the Magic Link plugin is not enough. It only stops the creation of new verified accounts. It does not stop the takeover of existing accounts.
Other sources
Better Auth is an authentication and authorization library for TypeScript. From 1.4.0-beta.18 until 1.7.7, deployments that enable Magic Link with storeToken set to plain, or with storeToken set to hashed and the global verification.storeIdentifier setting also set to hashed, enable a built-in social or Generic OAuth provider, and use account.storeStateStrategy set to database can accept an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. These settings can cause Magic Link verification records and OAuth state to resolve to the same stored identifier, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to start OAuth sign-in for a known email address and redeem the returned state through Magic Link without controlling the mailbox or completing the provider callback. The attacker can obtain a normal session for an existing user, or create an account incorrectly marked as email verified when sign-up is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.7.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/better-authto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.7.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade
better-authto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.7.7 - Configuration
Set account.storeStateStrategy to cookie.
Better Auth account account.storeStateStrategy = cookie - Configuration
Set the Magic Link plugin option storeToken to hashed, and leave global verification.storeIdentifier unset or set it to plain.
Better Auth Magic Link plugin storeToken = hashed - Configuration
Update custom verification.storeIdentifier.overrides rules so the magic-link: and auth-state: prefixes resolve to distinct stored identifiers.
Better Auth verification identifier overrides verification.storeIdentifier.overrides = magic-link: and auth-state: prefixes - Configuration
Turn off Magic Link sign-in, or turn off social and Generic OAuth sign-in.
Better Auth sign-in providers Magic Link, social, and Generic OAuth sign-in = disabled - Configuration
If OAuth Proxy is used, configure one dedicated OAuth Proxy secret across all participating environments, and ensure it differs from each environment's global Better Auth secret.
OAuth Proxy secret = dedicated secret distinct from each environment's global Better Auth secret - Operational
Request new Magic Links and restart pending OAuth or SAML sign-ins; links and state created before the upgrade cannot complete.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
How can I determine whether a deployment is exposed?
Check whether better-auth is in the affected range from 1.4.0-beta.18 until 1.7.7 and whether all of these conditions apply: Magic Link is enabled; storeToken is plain, or it is hashed with verification.storeIdentifier also hashed; a built-in social or Generic OAuth provider is enabled; and account.storeStateStrategy is database.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
The attacker needs a known target email address and must be able to initiate an OAuth sign-in flow. They do not need to control the target mailbox or complete the OAuth provider callback.
What is the practical impact of successful exploitation?
An unauthenticated attacker can obtain a normal session for an existing user. If sign-up is enabled, they can instead create an account that is incorrectly marked as email verified.
What version contains the fix?
The issue is fixed in better-auth version 1.7.7.