CVE-2026-115450: Price manipulation in the Ecommerce Template checkout flow through a client supplied Stripe price identifier
External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter (CWE-472) in the cart and checkout flow of MarcosCamara01 Ecommerce Template allows an authenticated user with no special privileges to be charged the price of one product while placing an order for another, because POST /api/user/cart accepts variantId, which determines what the order records, and stripeId, which determines what Stripe charges, as two independent fields of the request body, stores both on the cart row, and no check requires the stripeId to be the one that belongs to the variantId. POST /api/stripe/payment builds the Stripe Checkout line items from the stored value, as { price: item.stripeId, quantity }, so the amount charged is the amount of that Stripe price. The checkout.session.completed webhook then creates the order products from the variantId of the same cart row, so the order records a product that was not paid for. Every stripeId in the catalogue is readable by any visitor, so no value has to be guessed. This results in orders for goods at the price of the cheapest item in the catalogue, repeatable without limit, and in order records whose amount does not correspond to the product they list.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Patch e6b364cd668f2ba875cfa7f6d55c63e771715df7
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
Any authenticated user with no special privileges can exploit it. The Stripe price identifiers needed for the request are readable by any visitor, so the attacker does not need to guess them.
What must an attacker do to manipulate the amount charged?
The attacker submits a cart request in which variantId identifies the product they want recorded in the order and stripeId identifies a cheaper catalogue price. The application stores both values independently and later charges the supplied Stripe price.
Are orders and payment amounts affected after checkout completes?
Yes. The payment uses the stored stripeId, while the completed-checkout webhook creates order products from variantId. As a result, an order can list a product that was not paid for and its recorded amount may not match the listed product.
Can this be repeated or limited to a single purchase?
The issue is repeatable without limit according to the provided information. An attacker can repeatedly place orders for goods while paying the price associated with a cheaper catalogue item.